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Abstract 
 
This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for 
Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee, 
examines the EU’s mechanism of relocation of asylum seekers from Greece and 
Italy to other Member States. It examines the scheme in the context of the Dublin 
System, the hotspot approach, and the EU-Turkey Statement, recommending that 
asylum seekers’ interests, and rights be duly taken into account, as it is only 
through their full engagement that relocation will be successful. Relocation can 
become a system that provides flexibility for Member States and local host 
communities, as well as accommodating the agency and dignity of asylum 
seekers. This requires greater cooperation from receiving States, and a clearer 
role for a single EU legal and institutional framework to organise preference 
matching and rationalise efforts and resources overall.  
 
 
 
PE 583 132   EN 
  
ABOUT THE PUBLICATION 
 
 
This research paper was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs and commissioned, overseen and published by the Policy 
Department for Citizen's Rights and Constitutional Affairs. 
 
Policy Departments provide independent expertise, both in-house and externally, to support 
European Parliament committees and other parliamentary bodies in shaping legislation and 
exercising democratic scrutiny over EU external and internal policies.  
 
To contact the Policy Department for Citizen's Rights and Constitutional Affairs or to subscribe 
to its newsletter please write to:  
poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu 
 
Research Administrator Responsible  
Sarah SY 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
European Parliament 
B-1047 Brussels 
E-mail: poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu 
 
 
AUTHOR(S) 
Elspeth GUILD, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium 
Cathryn COSTELLO, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, UK 
Violeta MORENO-LAX, Queen Mary University of London, UK 
 
With research assistance from:  
Christina VELENTZA, Democritus University of Thrace, Greece 
Daniela VITIELLO, Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy 
Natascha ZAUN, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, UK 
 
LINGUISTIC VERSIONS 
 
Original: EN 
 
 
Manuscript completed in (March 2017) 
© European Union, 2017 
 
This document is available on the internet at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses 
 
DISCLAIMER 
The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do 
not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. 
Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the 
source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy. 
 
3 
CONTENTS 
 
CONTENTS 3 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 5 
LIST OF TABLES 6 
LIST OF FIGURES 6 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 
INTRODUCTION 11 
CHAPTER 1: THE COUNCIL’S RELOCATION DECISIONS 17 
1.1. Examining Relocation according to the Council Decisions and Dublin III 
Take Charge Provisions 17 
1.2. Relocation outside Dublin III Take Charge Provisions and within the 
Relocation Decisions 19 
1.3. Relocation rights and obligations and procedures 21 
1.4. Modifications introduced by the second Relocation Decision and the 
amending Decision 22 
CHAPTER 2: RELOCATION IN PRATICE 24 
2.1. Compliance, semi-compliance and non-compliance amongst States obliged 
to relocate 25 
2.2. Explaining good and bad performances in relocating states 29 
2.2.1. Political Support for relocation 29 
2.2.2. Administrative and reception capacity 32 
2.2.3. Reception Challenges for Vulnerable Asylum Seekers 34 
2.2.4. Perceptions regarding security threats posed by applications for 
relocation 34 
2.3.  Relocation in practice in Italy and Greece 35 
2.3.1. External Challenges from Receiving States 36 
2.3.2. Local Challenges in Greece 38 
2.3.3. Local Challenges in Italy 39 
2.4. Impact on Asylum Seekers in Greece and Italy 40 
2.5. Normative Challenges 41 
2.6. Conclusions and Recommendations 42 
CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF THE HOTSPOT APPROACH IN RELOCATION 44 
3.1. Overarching rationale of the hotspots-relocation tandem 44 
3.2. Practical role of the hotspot approach in relocation from Italy 45 
3.3. Practical role of the hotspot approach in relocation from Greece 48 
3.3.1. Before the EU-Turkey Statement 48 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4 
3.3.2. After the EU-Turkey Statement 48 
3.4. Conclusions and Recommendations: Overall contribution of the hotspot 
approach to relocation 50 
CHAPTER 4: THE ROLE OF EU AGENCIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN 
RELOCATION 52 
4.1. Hotspots and relocation as multi-actor ventures 52 
4.2. The role of EASO in hotspots and relocation 52 
4.2.1. The role of EASO in Italy’s hotspots and relocation scheme 52 
4.2.2. The role of EASO in Greece’s hotspots and relocation scheme 53 
4.3. The role of FRONTEX in hotspots and relocation 55 
4.3.1. The role of Frontex in Italy’s hotspots and relocation scheme 55 
4.3.2. The role of Frontex in Greece’s hotspots and relocation scheme 56 
4.4. The role of other EU agencies 56 
4.5. The role of the European Commission and related EU bodies 57 
4.6. The role of international organisations and NGOs 58 
4.7. Conclusions and Recommendations: The need for coordination and 
structured cooperation 58 
CHAPTER 5: THE PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE DUBLIN REGULATION FOR 
RELOCATION 60 
5.1. The coexistence of relocation with Dublin transfers 60 
5.2. Consolidating relocation: the Dublin IV proposal 62 
5.3. Advantages of the corrective allocation mechanism 63 
5.4. Disadvantages of the corrective allocation mechanism 63 
5.5. Conclusions and Recommendations: Alternatives to the envisaged scheme
 66 
CHAPTER 6: DEFINING THE BASE FOR EFFECTIVE RELOCATION: A RIGHTS-
BASED, DIGNITY-ORIENTED APPROACH FOLLOWING THE ‘DUBLIN 
WITHOUT COERCION’ PARADIGM 68 
REFERENCES 70 
Treaties 70 
EU Legislation 70 
EU documents and other official documents 70 
Cases 75 
Secondary sources/bibliography 75 
APPENDIX I:  METHODOLOGY 79 
APPENDIX II: LIST OF INTERVIEWS/SURVEY/OTHER ORIGINAL DATA 80 
ANNEX I: RELOCATING MEMBER STATES 81 
 
Implementation of the 2015 Council Decisions establishing provisional measures in the area of international 
protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CEAS Common European Asylum System 
CIR Consiglio Italiano per i Refugiati (Italian Refugee Council) 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
EASO European Asylum Support Office 
EBCG European Border and Coast Guards 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
EU European Union 
EUROSTAT European Commission Directorate-General in charge of 
providing statistical information  
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IO International Organisation 
LIBE Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee  
MEDU Medici per i diriti umani (Doctors for Human Rights, Italian NGO) 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
SOLID Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows (General 
Programme) 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6 
LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1: Top 10 relocators among Member States (plus 3 associated States) in relative terms
 ...................................................................................................................... 26 
Table 2: Last 10 relocators among Member States in relative terms ............................... 27 
Table 3: Top 10 pledgers in relative terms .................................................................. 28 
Table 4: Last 10 pledgers in relative terms ................................................................. 28 
Table 5: Asylum seekers relocated in relation to responsibility ...................................... 81 
Table 6: Pledges made in relation to responsibility ....................................................... 82 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Top 10 relocators in total (plus 2 associated States) ....................................... 25 
Figure 2: Last 10 relocators in total ........................................................................... 25 
Figure 3: Top 10 relocators and their performance ....................................................... 85 
Figure 4: Top ten pledgers ........................................................................................ 85 
 
  
Implementation of the 2015 Council Decisions establishing provisional measures in the area of international 
protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Background 
 
In September 2015 the Council adopted two Decisions regarding the relocation of asylum 
seekers from Greece and Italy to other Member States (‘the Relocation Decisions’). In total, 
the number of asylum seekers to be relocated was 160,000, to take place over 24 months 
from the adoption of the decisions. By 2 February 2017, 18 months into the relocation period, 
a total of 11,966 asylum seekers had been relocated from the two countries. The largest 
number of people relocated from Greece went to France (2,414) and from Italy to Germany 
(700). By any measure, this failure to make relocation work effectively and swiftly from the 
outset is striking. 
 
The second Relocation Decision included a distribution key based on the following elements: 
(a) The size of the population (40%), as it reflects the capacity to absorb a certain number 
of refugees; (b) total GDP (40%), as it reflects the absolute wealth of a country and is thus 
indicative for the capacity of an economy to absorb and integrate refugees; (c) average 
number of spontaneous asylum applications and the number of resettled refugees per 1 
million inhabitants over the period 2010-2014 (10%), as it reflects the international 
protection efforts made by Member States in the recent past; and (d) unemployment rate 
(10%), as an indicator reflecting the capacity to integrate refugees. Member States allocation 
under this distribution key was supposed to be mandatory with only the possibility for 
Member States to refuse an applicant on the basis of national security. 
 
Aims 
 
On this basis, the study pursues the following objectives: 
  
• To describe the development of the relocation scheme in the context of the Common 
European Asylum System and the movement of third-country national asylum seekers in 
2015; 
• To investigate the operation of the relocation scheme(s) established in September 2015, 
the successes, failures, and practical modalities; 
• To examine the reasons for resistance from several Member States to the relocation 
scheme; 
• To understand the practices in the relocation schemes that have contributed to satisfactory 
outcomes for asylum seekers, States and the EU, and those practices that have resulted 
in unsatisfactory outcomes for all involved; 
• To review the links between relocation and the ‘hotspots approach’ as well as action under 
the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 and their impact on the ground; 
• To unpack the implications of the incorporation of the relocation scheme in the Dublin IV 
reform through a permanent mechanism of corrective allocation; 
• To formulate concrete proposals to improve and rationalise the workings of relocation 
within the EU as a stable element of the Common European Asylum System. 
 
Issues and Recommendations 
 
In the Introduction, the research methodology, general orientation, and limitations to this 
study are explained. 
 
Chapter 1 reviews the central features of relocation in the EU and how this relates to the 
Dublin allocation of responsibility system. As the active participation of asylum seekers is 
critical to the success of relocation, it is recommended that the obligation under the Dublin 
Regulation to ensure family unity is complied with in a prompt and effective manner. This 
Dublin rule reflects asylum seekers’ human right to family life and the obligation to protect 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8 
the ‘best interests’ of the child, as per EU fundamental rights standards. Ensuring swift family 
reunion also greatly aids integration into host societies.  
The study, therefore, recommends in particular the following steps should be taken: 
• The class of family members eligible to join already present family members in a host 
Member State be enlarged; 
• The class of family members eligible to ‘sponsor’ a take-charge application be widened to 
include more that first-degree relations; 
• Take-charge applications based on family unity should be prioritised and dealt with as 
quickly as possible; 
• Take-charge applications should be admissible even where the Member State where the 
asylum seeker trying to be taken charge of has been unable to register his or her asylum 
application, or where return to a third country might be understood to render an 
application inadmissible. Family ties must take priority over admissibility criteria. 
 
It is further suggested that the EU should have regard to other areas of law and practice 
where preference matching is working successfully, such as in allocation of university places, 
ERAMSUS programmes, and other EU student mobility schemes. The study identifies the key 
principles of institutional design for preference matching systems that could make relocation 
work better. 
 
Chapter 2 examines relocation in practice, from the perspective of the receiving States, and 
on the ground in Greece and Italy. It found that, although the Relocation Decisions are legally 
binding, some Member States have refused or failed to comply with them. These include the 
Member States that voted against their adoption in the Council (Hungary, Czech Republic, 
and Slovakia), and a number of others, where practical and political challenges against 
relocation have emerged. While a few States are on track to meet their relocation 
commitments, most are not. The most common form of non-compliance has been the failure 
to pledge or provide sufficient (or in some cases any) relocation places. Even if they have 
pledged places, States reject relocation requests in a legally questionable manner. The 
explanations for varying degrees of compliance with the Relocation Decisions lie in varying 
degrees of 1) political support; 2) reception and processing capacity, in particular for 
vulnerable applicants; and 3) perceptions regarding security threats posed by applications 
for relocation. In both Italy and Greece, various practical obstacles have emerged on the 
ground, but the main problem is the lack of cooperation from receiving States. The result is 
that asylum seekers lack information on relocation, and are often left waiting, frustrated, and 
anxious.  
 
The study accordingly recommends that the failure of Member States to pledge relocation 
places be taken seriously as a threat to the rule of law at the EU level, which may warrant 
exploration, as well as formal enforcement action. The European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO) should develop robust systems for external monitoring of the workings of reception 
and processing systems, and help Member States develop more efficient chain management 
of the asylum process, to avoid blockages in reception centres. Overall a better package of 
penalties and incentives should be developed to encourage greater relocation pledges. The 
administrative and reception challenges in both Italy and Greece demand better coordination 
of all relevant agencies; greater personnel on the ground with the appropriate communication 
skills; and a swifter response to requests for relocation. On national security screening, EASO 
should develop clear guidelines on this matter, both substantively and institutionally. The 
European Police Office (EUROPOL)’s role should be clarified, in particular in ensuring proper 
communication across pertinent authorities when there are genuine national security 
concerns. Finally, many of the practical problems with the workings of relocation would be 
alleviated if Member States were pledging places simultaneously, which would enable 
effective preference matching. The voice and agency of asylum seekers must be taken into 
account if the relocation system is to respect and protect their human rights, and work 
effectively. 
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Chapter 3 analyses the role of the ‘hotspot approach’ in relocation, finding that both are 
operationally linked. Hotspots were conceived to work as ‘enablers’ to the relocation scheme. 
When first designed, its key function was to support the identification of candidates for 
relocation. Yet, the practical focus has shifted over time to migration control, giving rise to 
an emphasis on pre-emption of onward movement that has led to instances of serious 
fundamental rights violations in both Italy and Greece - in the latter, particularly after the 
adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement. In addition, this investigation has found that, overall, 
hotspots have not helped in alleviating pressure on the Italian and Greek systems. On the 
contrary, they increase burdens, because of structural shortcomings in their design and 
implementation and due to continuing applications, exacerbating the flaws of the Dublin 
system that the relocation scheme intended to repair.  
The study, therefore, recommends a return to the original purpose of the Relocation 
Decisions, with the ‘hotspot approach’ regaining its international protection rationale, 
recognising the needs and rights of the forced migrants concerned.    
 
Chapter 4 investigates the role of EASO and other institutions in the relocation scheme, 
concluding that, together with EASO, several other EU agencies, international bodies, and 
other loosely coordinated actors contribute to the implementation of the ‘hotspot approach’ 
and relocation schemes. Their roles vary, and there is a lack of coordination, due to the 
absence of a clear definition of roles and responsibilities. In this setup, this research 
establishes that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) plays a key role, in 
some respects even more prominent than that of EASO, as it is charged with assistance to 
nationality determination – which constitutes the gateway to relocation. Yet, both agencies 
assume tasks and powers beyond the explicit terms of their founding Regulations, acting 
without a clear EU legal mandate. Also, the lack of a proper operational hierarchy in existing 
coordination structures between contributing agencies and other stakeholders on the ground 
creates barriers to the translation of legal priorities into practical action. This generates real 
risks of fundamental rights violations and the degradation of international protection 
guarantees.  
Accordingly, the study recommends reinforcement of the legal and organisational 
framework, through the adoption of a dedicated EU instrument detailing arrangements and 
responsibilities of each individual actor, and advocate the introduction of independent 
monitoring mechanisms and channels of democratic and judicial oversight to ensure respect 
for fundamental rights. 
 
Chapter 5 analyses the Commission’s proposal on Dublin IV regarding relocation. The 
current coexistence of the relocation scheme with Dublin transfers, in light of statistical 
evidence, is revealed as internally inconsistent and structurally flawed. It leads to perverse 
outcomes, with incoming Dublin transfers outnumbering relocation figures, wasting resources 
and compounding strain on beneficiary Member States. Therefore, it is concluded that the 
resumption of Dublin transfers to Greece, as suggested by the European Commission, is 
premature and, given current reception conditions in Greece, likely to still be incompatible 
with ECHR and EU Charter human rights standards. By contrast, the consolidation of the 
relocation scheme as part of the Dublin IV reform is to be welcomed, as it will provide 
continuity to the system on a permanent basis. Yet, the fundamental shortcomings of the 
Dublin system should first be addressed. Maintaining the key features of Dublin will only 
perpetuate deficiencies and consolidate the unfairness inbuilt into the system, contradicting 
the spirit of Article 80 TFEU. In fact, the new corrective allocation scheme, if adopted as is, 
will play a very small role in relieving pressure from beneficiary Member States, because 
most cases will not qualify for transfer due to the new admissibility and security tests pre-
phased to Dublin rules. That Member States may choose not to participate in the scheme 
through payment of a financial contribution is also ethically and empirically at odds with 
Article 80 TFEU.  
 
For these reasons, the study recommends that a centralised system, doing away with Dublin 
deficiencies, be adopted instead. It would reduce bureaucratisation, break the unfairness 
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inherent in the ‘first-country-of-entry’ rule, maximise fair distribution potential, and allocate 
resources more effectively. In any event, whatever the course finally taken, the rights and 
preferences of asylum seekers ought to be taken into account in line with EU fundamental 
rights obligations and for purely practical reasons, to diminish onward movements and 
recourse to coercion. Short of a system of free choice, the ‘preference matching tool’ 
developed by EASO within the relocation scheme should be further developed. 
 
In Chapter 6, the study identifies the key elements necessary for the Dublin IV provisions 
on relocation to be effective and finds that there are real opportunities to make relocation a 
viable and useful part of the CEAS. It puts forward that, to fulfil their potential, the measures 
need to be based on cooperation with asylum seekers and the recognition that their 
acceptance of relocation is key to the success of the system.  
The study, thus, recommends that asylum seekers be fully involved in the relocation 
process, be provided with ample reliable information on the range of options available to 
them, and have their preferences taken into account. Family unity must be granted priority 
(over and above relocation), in line with fundamental rights obligations and also due to its 
practical potential to facilitate integration in the host community. Asylum-seekers with family 
members in the EU should not have their claims deemed inadmissible. Legally, the human 
rights principles of family unity and best interests of the child take priority over any 
admissibility criteria. 
 
Relocation under the distribution key should only be pursued when reunion on the basis of 
family links has been fully exhausted. Within the Dublin system, the take-charge provisions 
should have priority over relocation; asylum seekers need reliable and accurate information 
about the living conditions and integration possibilities for them in the proposed relocation 
State. The engagement of civil society is key in making relocation work properly in this 
regard; the active participation of asylum seekers is an essential part of making relocation 
effective and durable; The establishment of a clearing-house system, as many Member 
States have for young people seeking university places, for asylum seekers relocation; key 
tenets of the ‘Dublin without coercion’ model, taking full account of asylum seekers agency 
and dignity, should be incorporated into any replacements of the Dublin III Regulation and 
Relocation Decisions. 
 
It is critical that the EU genuinely acknowledges that refugees are an opportunity, not a 
burden, and so helping them to achieve their potential is also in the interests of the EU as a 
whole. In line with the ‘Dublin without coercion’ model – expounded in two previous studies 
for the European Parliament on this matter.1 The study finds that this can best be achieved 
through cooperation, rather than coercion. 
 
In the conclusions the study revisits key findings from each Chapter and summarises the 
recommendations highlighted above. 
  
                                                 
1Guild et al., Enhancing the Common European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin, Study PE 519.234 
(European Parliament, 2015); Guild et al., New Approaches, Alternative Avenues and Means of Access to Asylum 
Procedures for Persons Seeking International, Study PE 509.989 (European Parliament, 2014).  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 
• The arrival of asylum seekers in 2014-15 in larger numbers than many Member States 
had anticipated led to substantial friction among Member States regarding their 
individual responsibilities;  
• The Commission responded in May 2015 with proposals to revise the system of 
responsibility for asylum applications from first country of arrival (Dublin III) to 
include a corrective allocation mechanism;  
• To bring the corrective allocation mechanism into force quickly the Commission 
proposed the two Relocation Decisions adopted in September 2015 after 
consultation with the European Parliament; 
• The first Relocation Decision proposed the relocation of 40,000 asylum seekers from 
Italy and Greece, the second 120,000, which, by December 2016, according to the 
Commission (2 February 2017), have resulted in a mere 11,966 actual relocations 
out of the total of 160,000 foreseen. 
 
The European Parliament’s Policy Department on Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
has published a number of key studies on the CEAS, at the request of the LIBE Committee. 
Among these are ‘Enhancing the Common European Asylum System and Alternatives to 
Dublin’ (PE 519.234) and ‘The Implementation of the Common European Asylum System’ (PE 
556.953).2 At the request of the LIBE Committee, the Policy Department now seeks an 
analysis of the 2015 Council Decisions on Relocation of Asylum Seekers (‘the Relocation 
Decisions’) and the possible changes to the Dublin system that may result. It is this aspect 
of the CEAS that we address in this study.  
 
This study has drawn on a comprehensive review of official, NGO and scholarly works on 
relocation, as well as the Commission’s reports on the progress of relocation and 
resettlement,3 the most recent of which (the Ninth Report) has been published on 8 February 
2017.4 This study also draws on an ECRE study on the implementation of hotspots in Italy 
and Greece (including relocation),5 as well as its earlier report on admissibility, that also 
                                                 
2 Guild et al., Enhancing the Common European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin, Study PE 519.234 
(European Parliament, 2015); Guild et al., New Approaches, Alternative Avenues and Means of Access to Asylum 
Procedures for Persons Seeking International, Study PE 509.989 (European Parliament, 2014). 
3 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to European Parliament, the European Council and 
the Council. First Report on Relocation and Resettlement, COM(2016) 165, 16 March 2016; Second Report on 
Relocation and Resettlement, COM(2016) 222, 12 April 2016; Commission, Communication from the Commission 
to European Parliament, the European Council and the Council. Third Report on Relocation and Resettlement, 
COM(2016)360, 18 May 2016; European Commission, Communication from the Commission to European Parliament, 
the European Council and the Council. Fourth Report on Relocation and Resettlement, COM(2016) 416, 15 June 
2016; Communication from the Commission to European Parliament, the European Council and the Council. Fifth 
Report on Relocation and Resettlement, COM(2016) 480, 13 July 2016; European Commission, Communication from 
the Commission to European Parliament, the European Council and the Council. Sixth Report on Relocation and 
Resettlement, COM(2016)636, 28 September 2016; European Commission, Communication from the Commission 
to European Parliament, the European Council and the Council. Seventh Report on Relocation and Resettlement, 
COM(2016) 720, 9 November 2016; European Commission, Communication from the Commission to European 
Parliament, the European Council and the Council. Eight Report on Relocation and Resettlement, COM(2016) 791, 8 
December 2016; European Commission, Report from the Commission to European Parliament, the European Council 
and the Council. Ninth report on relocation and resettlement, COM (2017) 74 final, 8 February 2017. 
4 European Commission Ninth report on relocation and resettlement.  
5 ECRE, The implementation of the hotspots in Italy and Greece, (5 December 2016). 
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includes an assessment of the workings of relocation. 6  These sources have been 
complemented by surveys, interviews and informal consultations with key stakeholders, as 
explained in Appendices I and II. 
 
The arrival of a significant number of asylum seekers into the EU in 2014 and 2015 had many 
drivers. These include the range of drivers for Syrian refugees (worsening conflict and 
atrocities in Syria as the conflict entered its fourth year; insecurity, precarity and lack of 
prospects for refugees in countries neighbouring Syria). For those fleeing other countries, 
the drivers were also acute - conflict and insecurity in Iraq, Afghanistan (and insecurity for 
Afghans in neighbouring countries), and on-going repression in countries such as Eritrea. 
Already by the spring of 2015, Member States of destination of asylum seekers were seeking 
a revision of the system of responsibility of reception and asylum determination for those 
seeking international protection. Sweden and Germany were among the leaders in this 
regard. As the movement of asylum-seekers in Europe has always defied the rules in the 
Dublin System,7 following this trend, most asylum-seekers who arrived in Greece and Italy 
made their way to Northern European States. While refugees can be a huge benefit for host 
societies,8 irregular and unplanned arrivals place a strain on reception systems and risk 
political backlashes.  
 
The absence of safe and legal means to claim asylum from outside the EU was a key 
contributing factor to the crisis – it created a massive market for the services of smugglers, 
and a ‘now or never’ mass influx. We share the conclusion of many scholars that ‘a policy of 
prohibiting refugee movement [from outside the EU into the EU], the absence of a credible 
resettlement policy, and the lack of acceptable reception and living conditions and prospects 
in the region combined to bring about the increase’.9 Unfortunately, in spite of a small 
increase in the resettlement of some refugees by European States, there has been no 
concerted development of safe and legal routes to seek asylum in the EU. Indeed recent 
restrictions on family reunification for refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries 
already in Europe are likely to create further demand for irregular passage to Europe.10 
 
The issue of what became known as ‘secondary movement’ of asylum seekers took centre 
stage in many EU discussions. This term captures the phenomenon of movement of asylum 
seekers from one Member State where they do not want to apply for asylum to another 
Member State where they do want to do so. The issue of secondary movement is difficult to 
resolve without the active participation of asylum seekers in the decision making regarding 
where they should live. Throughout the 20 years of operation of the Dublin system, 11 
designed (inter alia) to prevent secondary movement, one thing has become evident – it is 
virtually impossible to oblige asylum seekers to stay in a Member State where they do not 
want to be, particularly if that Member State does not offer effective protection.  
 
                                                 
6 ECRE, Admissibility, responsibility and safety in European asylum procedures (7 September 2016). 
7 See the discussion in Guild et al., Enhancing the Common European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin, 
Study PE 519.234 (European Parliament, 2015). 
8 Refugees are not necessarily a burden on host states but more commonly an opportunity.  See Türk, Volker, and 
Madeline Garlick. "From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees." International Journal of Refugee Law 28.4 (2016): 656-678. 
9 H Battjes, E Brouwer, L Slingenberg, & T Spijkerboer ‘The Crisis of European Refugee Law: Lessons from Lake 
Success’ CMLRev; C Costello & M Mouzourakis ‘The CEAS – Where did it all go wrong?’ in M Fletcher, E Herlin Karnell 
and C Matera (eds) The European Union as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Routledge 2016). 
10 C Costello, K Groenendijk, L Halleskov Storgaard, Realizing Refugees’ Rights to Family Reunification in Europe, 
(Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Issue Paper 2017, forthcoming). 
11 From the entry into force of the Dublin Convention in 1997, its incorporation into the EU Treaty in 1999 and the 
adoption of the first Dublin Regulation until now.  
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Curiously, the EU was never seriously tempted to open a temporary protection scheme in 
accordance with the Directive of that name adopted in 200112 for Syrian (and possibly other) 
asylum seekers in this period of substantial arrivals. This Directive was designed to deal with 
the event of a mass influx into the EU of displaced persons from third countries who are 
unable to return to their country of origin,13 but it regulates the rights and conditions of 
residence of persons in need of international protection in mass influx situations, not their 
allocation among Member States (at least, not in detail). Nonetheless, it remains a question 
why there was no political will to open such a scheme when the problem of secondary 
movement was and is so closely connected with the differences among Member States in the 
treatment of asylum seekers and the operation of the mechanisms for determining their 
claims. Instead, the Commission first proposed substantial changes to the Dublin III 
Regulation, which would introduce a system of relocation of asylum seekers in the form of a 
‘corrective allocation mechanism’ to distribute asylum seekers among the Member States in 
a ‘fair’ manner (fair to whom is not expressly clarified, but implicitly ‘fair’ applies to Member 
States’ vision of what is fair to themselves, not what asylum seekers may consider fair). The 
distribution is proposed to take place through a reference key according to which Member 
States’ ‘capacity’ is determined.14 As changes to the Dublin III Regulation were going to take 
a lot of time and include co-decision with the European Parliament, the Commission and 
Council agreed to proceed rapidly with a relocation system of sorts through the mechanism 
of the Relocation Decisions. This had the effect of including the European Parliament only in 
a consultative capacity (rather than as co-decider). 
 
The Commission announced in its European Agenda on Migration of 13 May 2015,15 it would, 
1) by the end of May, propose triggering the emergency response system envisaged under 
Article 78(3) TFEU and 2) and table by the end of 2015 a legislative proposal to provide for 
a mandatory and automatically-triggered relocation system to distribute those in clear need 
of international protection within the EU when a mass influx emerges.  However, instead, this 
was followed by the proposal for the Relocation Decision – a decision establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece.16 The 
Council adopted the two Relocation Decisions in September 2015 and an amending Decision 
in September 2016. First was the Decision of 14 September 2015, establishing provisional 
measures for the benefit of Italy and Greece (proposing the relocation of 40,000 asylum 
seekers from those two countries),17 then the Decision of 22 September 2015, with the same 
title (proposing the relocation of 120,000 asylum seekers from those countries),18 and a third 
Decision a year later on 29 September 2016 amending the second one (to provide for Member 
States to admit refugees from Turkey to fill their obligations).19 The contents and impact of 
the Relocation Decisions will be examined in the next Chapter and their operation in practice 
in Chapters 2 and 3. Denmark and the UK exercised their opt outs not to participate in the 
                                                 
12 Council of the European Union, Council Directive 20 01/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum Standards for Giving 
Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures Promoting a Balance of 
Efforts Between Member States in Receiving such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof, 7 August 2001, OJ 
L.212/12-212/23; 7.8.2001, 2001/55/EC, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ddcee2e4.html [accessed 5 
March 2017]. 
13 Ibid, Temporary Protection Directive, Article 1. 
14 This proposal has run into very heavy weather in the Council, including outright rejection by some Member States 
– the issue will be examined in Chapter 5. 
15 COM(2015) 240 13 May 2015.  
16 COM(2015) 286 27 May 2015. 
17 European Union: Council of the European Union, Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 
establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece, 14 
September 2015, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5604094a4.html [accessed 21 January 2017] 
18  Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. 
19  Council Decision (EU) 2016/1754 of 29 September 2016 amending Decision (EU) 2015/1601 establishing 
provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece 
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Decisions or the relocation schemes, although Ireland did opt in to the relocation system, as 
did the Dublin Associated States of Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein.  
 
The next major consequence of refugee arrivals in 2015, commenced by the German 
Government in September 2015, was a series of closures of intra-Schengen border-crossing 
points designed to slow down the movement of asylum seekers across the EU. 20  The 
perspective of some Member States receiving large numbers of asylum seekers was that 
there should be a more equal distribution of asylum seekers across the Union and, until this 
was achieved, they would act unilaterally by closing some of their intra-EU borders to deter 
arrivals. Some also orchestrated the closure of the so-called ‘Balkan Route’ through which 
asylum seekers had transited from Greece in their way mainly to Germany. Notably Austria 
facilitated the conference leading Macedonia to close its land border with Greece (until that 
time the main entry way to countries of asylum for those who fled via Greece).21 This 
profoundly altered the predicament of asylum-seekers in Greece, who prior to that (at least 
at some points in the time period under discussion) had the option of onward movement 
from Greece across the Balkans by land. While there have also been intermittent land border 
closures between Italy and France, the closure of the Greek-Macedonian border (being a non-
Schengen border) has been durable.22 
 
The issue of reception and registration became a central theme of Member States’ concern 
in 2015. In the discussions around the re-introduction of intra-Schengen border controls in a 
small number of Member States, a constant reason given for the necessity of this rather 
drastic measure by those Member States closing some of their border crossing points was 
that asylum seekers had to be registered and documented as soon as possible and this was 
not happening at the places of first entry into the EU. Further, the Dublin system which is 
often portrayed politically as allocating responsibility for reception and procedural 
determination of asylum seekers to the first Member State through which the asylum seeker 
entered the EU (in spite of the legal primacy of the family unity criterion) was inoperable in 
respect of Greece, as a result of CJEU and ECtHR judgments,23 and only partially operable in 
respect of Italy.24 In respect of the rest of the EU, the application of the Dublin allocation 
rules was and continues to be haphazard.25 This was recognised by the decision of the 
German asylum authorities to make public its position regarding the non-implementation of 
Dublin returns, in particular for Syrian protection seekers.26  
 
The challenges to the Schengen border control-free area, prompted by the arrival of asylum 
seekers in 2014/2015, have been the subject of very different actions by the EU institutions 
                                                 
20 The European Parliament published a study on this aspect of the arrival of asylum seekers Internal border controls 
in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof? June 2016 PE 571 356  
21  AIDA Reception report on Summit of 24 February 2016, (March 2016), p. 20, available at:   
http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/shadow-reports/aida_wrong_counts_and_closing_doors.pdf      
22 See Guild et al ‘What is happening at Schengen Borders?’ Ref; C Costello & M Mouzourakis ‘The CEAS – Where 
did it all go wrong?’ in M Fletcher, E Herlin Karnell and C Matera (eds) The European Union as an Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (Routledge 2016). 
23 N. S. (C 411/10) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and M. E. (C 493/10) and others v. Refugee 
Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform , C-411/10 and C-493/10, European 
Union: Court of Justice of the European Union, 21 December 2011, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ef1ed702.html [accessed 21 January 2017]; M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece, Application no. 30696/09, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 21 January 2011, available 
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d39bc7f2.html [accessed 21 January 2017] 
24  Tarakhel v. Switzerland, Application no. 29217/12, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 4 
November 2014, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5458abfd4.html [accessed 21 January 2017] 
25  See EASO’s Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in Europe 2015 
https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/EN_%20Annual%20Report%202015_1.pdf accessed 21 
January 2017. 
26 Complete citations: https://www.wsj.com/articles/obscure-german-tweet-help-spur-migrant-march-from-
hungary-1441901563 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/25/it-took-on-a-life-of-its-own-how-rogue-
tweet-led-syrians-to-germany  
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beyond the scope of this study. However, it must be borne in mind that the political 
discussions reveal that national governments remain concerned about secondary movement, 
which is also framed as a Schengen challenge. The compromise solution proposed is 
relocation of a relatively small number of asylum seekers from the Member State of first 
arrival to a host Member State. The level of responsibility is determined on the basis of a set 
of factors contained in a relocation key and is ultimately dependent on the willingness of a 
Member State to receive the relocated asylum seeker. The operation of this relocation system 
is the subject of the following chapters. 
 
The significance of relocation for the credibility of the EU as an international and regional 
actor should not be underestimated. Agreeing to use the distribution key in the Relocation 
Decisions is thus of profound symbolic, political, and practical importance. Although, the 
numbers envisaged for relocation are relatively paltry, the practice of working across borders 
to share responsibility for persons (rather than shifting that responsibility elsewhere) is 
crucial. It is a crucial corrective to two unsustainable models – one where all asylum-seekers 
are cordoned in countries of first arrival (Dublin with coercion), the other where they make 
their own way en masse to a small number of Member States that are perceived to offer 
protection (as exemplified by the self-distribution that prevailed in 2014). Many EU Member 
States experienced no significant increase in numbers of asylum-seekers in 2015, during the 
so-called ‘refugee crisis’. The sustainability of refugee protection in Europe depends in part 
on ensuring that all Member States do their fair share.   
 
Relocation under the distribution key should only be pursued when reunion on the 
basis of family links has been fully exhausted. Within the Dublin system, the take-
charge provisions should have priority over relocation; asylum seekers need reliable 
and accurate information about the living conditions and integration possibilities 
for them in the proposed relocation State. The engagement of civil society is key in 
making relocation work properly in this regard; the active participation of asylum 
seekers is an essential part of making relocation effective and durable; The 
establishment of a clearing-house system, as many Member States have for young people 
seeking university places, for asylum seekers relocation; key tenets of the ‘Dublin without 
coercion’ model, taking full account of asylum seekers agency and dignity, should be 
incorporated into any replacements of the Dublin III Regulation and Relocation 
Decisions. 
 
 
 
Textbox 1: Refugees from Hungary (1956) – Sharing Responsibility 
 
In a speech to the European Parliament on 15 September 2015, António Guterres, then 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, made the following remarks:  
 
‘59 years ago we had the first large European and the first large UNHCR refugee crisis after 
the end of the cycle of displacement caused by the Second World War. It was the Hungarian 
crisis of 1956. At that time, 200,000 Hungarians fled - 180,000 to Austria and 20,000 to 
Yugoslavia. There was no Schengen regime then, but the borders were open and they came 
to Austria and Yugoslavia. And it was possible to launch a programme of relocation and 
resettlement from Austria in which 140,000 Hungarians were moved from Austria to several 
European countries and out of Europe. The relocation to other European countries took less 
than three months. At that time, European integration was only starting, there was no 
European Union, but at least the part of it that could be united was united, to protect the 
Hungarian victims of oppression and dictatorship. 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16 
Today, unfortunately, we may have a European Union, but Europe is no longer united; Europe 
is divided.’27 
 
In 1956, the Austrian delegate to UN urged states to ‘accept the largest possible number of 
refugees without imposing any formalities.’ His plea was met with swift and effective action. 
UNHCR referred to the very heavy burden on Austria where one person in every hundred was 
now a refugee. UNREF (United Nations Refugee Fund) Executive Committee Resolution on 
the problem of Hungarian refugees (1956), noting that ‘the care of refugees is a burden to 
be shared by the whole world in accordance with the capacities of the respective countries.’ 
Within months, only 410 refugees were left in in Austria, with the others having relocated to 
36 other states: Argentina (1,020), Australia (11,680), Belgium (5,850), Brazil (1,660), 
Canada (27,280), Chile (270), Colombia (220), Costa Rica (30), Cuba (5), Cyprus (2), 
Denmark (1,380), Dominican Republic (580), Ecuador (1), Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland (60), France (12,690), Germany (15,470), Iceland (50), Ireland (540), Israel 
(2,060), Italy (4,090), Luxembourg (240), Netherlands (3,650),135 New Zealand (1,090), 
Nicaragua (4), Norway (1,590), Paraguay (7), Portugal (4), Spain (19), Sweden (7,290), 
Switzerland (12,870), Turkey (510), Uruguay (37), Venezuela (780), Union of South Africa 
(1,330), United Kingdom (20,990), and the United States (40,650). 
 
Sources: M Zieck ‘The 1956 Hungarian Refugee Emergency, an Early and Instructive Case of 
Resettlement’ (2013) Amsterdam Law Forum 45, available at 
http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/viewFile/314/487;  
Colville ‘The Hungarian Refugees – 50 Years On’ (2006) Refugees 
http://www.unhcr.org/4523cb392.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27  António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Remarks at European Parliament 
AFET/DROI/LIBE committees – Joint Event on Migration “Respecting Human Rights in the Context of Migration Flows 
in the Mediterranean”. Brussels, 15 September 2015, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/admin/hcspeeches/55fbbdbf9/european-parliament-afetdroilibe-committees-joint-event-
migration-respecting.html  
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CHAPTER 1: THE COUNCIL’S RELOCATION DECISIONS 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 
• The 14 September 2015 Council Decision provided for relocation of 40,000 
asylum seekers, but did not indicate the obligations on Member States; the 22 
September 2015 Decision added an objective of a further 120,000 relocations and 
set out how many asylum seekers each Member State would be responsible 
for relocating;  
• Relocating asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other Member States would 
happen by way of a derogation from the Dublin III allocation scheme; 
• The only ground on which Member States may refuse to relocate asylum seekers 
is that the individual is a danger to public security or public order or excludable 
under the Qualification Directive; 
• Eligibility for relocation is based primarily on nationality. Certain nationalities are 
deemed eligible for relocation if the past average recognition rate for that nationality 
in the EU is 75% or more. This criterion is legally and ethically problematic, and 
has meant that even in its short time span, the nationalities eligible for relocation 
have changed considerably. For examples, Iraqis were initially eligible for relocation, 
but later became ineligible.  
• Disputed identification of nationality and continuing substantial differences 
among Member States in recognition rates of beneficiaries of international 
protection raise questions about the legitimacy of this criterion. 
 
 
1.1. Examining Relocation according to the Council Decisions and 
Dublin III Take Charge Provisions 
 
The Relocation Decisions of September 2015 sought to address the arrival of asylum seekers 
in Greece and Italy. (The Commission had initially proposed relocation from Hungary too, 
although this ceased to be relevant when Hungary requested that it no longer be included). 
The apparent inability of those two Member States to deal with arrivals, and the fact that at 
the time the decisions were adopted, the mass arrivals in Greece were travelling onwards of 
their own accord, mainly to seek asylum in Germany and Sweden. Figures are an important 
part of this story as set out in each of the Decisions. According to the Decision of 14 
September, 170,000 asylum seekers had arrived (irregularly) in Italy in 2014 and 50,000 in 
Greece in 2014. By September 2015, the rate of arrivals in Greece had increased significantly, 
with several thousand people arriving irregularly on the Greek islands from Turkey each day, 
most of whom had strong international protection needs.   
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However, the numbers and percentages must be understood in context. The population of 
the EU is over 500 million of which 59 million live in Italy and 11 million in Greece. According 
to the UN’s World Tourism Organisation the EU 28 received over 455 million tourists in 2014, 
of which 214 million visited the Southern Mediterranean countries. 28  These figures are 
provided not to trivialise the difference between voluntary tourist arrivals and people fleeing 
conflict and persecution, but rather to place the arrivals of asylum seekers into a scale. The 
challenge to Italy and Greece in respect of numbers of asylum seekers is tiny in comparison 
with what is presented as the opportunity of tourist arrivals. The availability of reception 
conditions for tourists is based on the ability of tourists to pay for them, while asylum seekers 
are generally required to stay in publicly funded reception centres. 
 
The tragedies taking place in the Mediterranean, with loss of life in shipwrecks of unseaworthy 
boats headed towards EU destinations, were a focus of attention in 2015. The European 
Parliament passed a Resolution on 29 April 2015, reiterating the need for an EU response to 
these tragedies on the basis of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility.29 It called for more 
efforts to assist States receiving large numbers of asylum seekers. A few days before the 
Parliament’s Resolution, the European Council, in its statement of 23 April 2015, had called 
for increased emergency assistance to ‘frontline’ States and for the consideration of 
emergency relocation between Member States on a voluntary basis.30 This was followed by 
the European Council conclusions of 24 – 25 June 2015, which underlined that three elements 
had to be dealt with in parallel: (1) relocation/resettlement; (2) return/readmission and 
reintegration; and (3) cooperation with countries of origin and transit. In these conclusions 
it called for the relocation of 40,000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other Member 
States. This kick-started the process leading to the Relocation Decisions.  
  
Italy and Greece had already received substantial emergency assistance from the EU to assist 
with the reception and processing of asylum seekers. In particular, EASO was providing 
extensive practical support. These two Member States were the second and third largest 
beneficiaries of the SOLID funds in the 2007 – 2013 period, but with perhaps disappointing 
outcomes. On the basis of Article 78(3) TFEU, the Council adopted the first Relocation 
Decision, providing for a relocation scheme for a limited period of 24 months, commencing 
on 15 September 2015. At the time of writing in February 2017, 18 months have already 
passed, and unless renewed, the relocation scheme will end on 14 September 2017. The 
choice of framework for the relocation scheme was very specific – it is a temporary derogation 
from the Dublin III provisions on allocation of responsibility for reception and determining 
asylum applications. This choice is not self-evident. Article 78 TFEU (ex-Article 63 TEC) is 
also the legal basis of the Temporary Protection Directive and could have been the legal basis 
for relocation as a flanking measure to temporary protection or otherwise. The derogation 
from the Dublin III system fits well, however, with the Commission’s proposal to amend the 
system to include a permanent relocation element into it and may work as an incentive to 
accelerate negotiations.  
 
While the relocation scheme is stated to be a derogation from the Dublin system, this 
derogation is only partial. According to preamble (19) of the First Relocation Decision, 
relocation measures do not absolve Member States from applying Dublin III in full as regards 
family reunification, special protection of unaccompanied minors, and the discretionary clause 
on humanitarian grounds. Article 10 Dublin III (proposed Article 12 Dublin IV) provides that, 
if an asylum seeker has a family member (spouse, minor children, father, mother or another 
adult responsible for a child, proposed to be widened to include siblings in Dublin IV) who 
has an immigration/asylum status or whose application for international protection is pending 
                                                 
http://www.e-unwto.org/doi/pdf/10.18111/9789284416899 accessed 22 January 2017. 
29 European Parliament resolution on the latest tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU migration and asylum 
policies  (2015/2660(RSP))  
30 Special meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 – statement. 
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in a Member State, that State is responsible for the asylum seeker, assuming the asylum 
seeker agrees (the take charge provision). As many families suffer separation in the process 
of flight, often with some family members arriving later than others, this part of the allocation 
system is very important.  
 
It became a focus of attention in February and July 2015 when British courts determined that 
there was an obligation on the UK authorities to bring family members to the UK of asylum 
seekers, beneficiaries of international protection or persons otherwise permitted to remain in 
the UK. The judgments were specifically about the informal camp in Calais (France), but of 
wider application, and were motivated in accordance with Dublin III take-charge duty and 
the obligation to respect family life in Article 8 ECHR. The ruling acknowledged that given the 
dysfunction of the Dublin family unity process, the UK was nonetheless obliged to ensure 
swift family reunification in order to meet its obligations under Article 8 ECHR.31 This ruling 
reflects the primacy of the duty to ensure family unity.  
 
A common problem in Member States with dysfunctional or overburdened asylum systems is 
that it is very difficult for asylum seekers to register their claims at all. But if they do not 
manage to register their asylum claims the take-charge provisions of Dublin III are not 
triggered. So, in the cases brought before the British courts, family members, including 
unaccompanied minors, were languishing in Calais while their families in the UK were unable 
to trigger the Dublin take-charge clause for them to be reunited, because an asylum 
application had not been registered in France. The British courts found that this created a 
tension between Dublin III and Article 8 ECHR (respect for family life), which could be 
resolved by disregarding the requirement of Dublin III that an asylum application had to be 
registered in the Member State of current presence of the asylum seeker before a take-
charge claim could be made to another Member State. So long as the asylum seeker had 
made some effort to register the claim, the UK must commence the take-charge procedure 
and bring the family members to the UK, notwithstanding the lack of response by the host 
Member State.  
 
This requirement to achieve family reunification as quickly as possible as contained in the 
take charge system of Dublin III and IV is critical to the well being and integration of refugees 
and must be applied rapidly and without obstacles by all Member States as acknowledged in 
the Relocation Decisions. 
 
1.2. Relocation outside Dublin III Take Charge Provisions and within 
the Relocation Decisions 
 
According to the first Relocation Decision, only asylum seekers who have successfully lodged 
an application in Italy or Greece (and for whom those States would normally be Dublin 
responsible) are eligible for relocation. The lodging of an asylum application for these 
purposes also requires the individual to have been through an identification procedure and 
to have been registered and fingerprinted. This means that any asylum seeker who has not 
been successful in registering his or her asylum application is excluded from the possibility 
of relocation (see above on Dublin take charge). Secondly, relocation is only available for 
asylum seekers who arrived in Greece or Italy after 15 August 2015, according to the First 
Relocation Decision, and after 24 March 2015, according to the Second Relocation Decision. 
It seems the evidential burden is on the asylum seeker to prove when he or she arrived.  
 
                                                 
31 Secretary of State for the Home Department v ZAT, [2016] EWCA Civ 810, United Kingdom: Court of Appeal 
(England and Wales), 2 August 2016, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/57bf02554.html [accessed 22 
January 2017] 
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The next key criterion is nationality. In order to avoid the relocation of asylum seekers with 
little chance of being successful in their claims to international protection, the Commission 
proposed and the Council chose to apply a nationality criterion to relocation. Only asylum 
seekers holding the nationality of a country 75% of whose nationals who applied for 
protection in the EU in the previous quarter and were recognised as refugees or granted 
international protection are eligible. This is quite a complex formula. First, nationality of the 
asylum seeker is critical. As many asylum seekers arrive in the EU without documents or with 
unreliable documents, there is often difficulty establishing what their nationality is. Some 
evidence indicates that the allocation of a nationality to an asylum seeker can be a contested 
matter.32 If the opportunity to be included in the relocation scheme depends on the correct 
assessment of nationality, this needs to be done most carefully in a spirit of trust and 
cooperation between the asylum seeker and the official whose job this is.  
 
Secondly, every asylum seeker’s possible inclusion in the relocation scheme is dependent on 
EUROSTAT’s quarterly statistics on asylum. The key figure is the first instance decision on 
every asylum application. Since the Decisions were adopted, two EUROSTAT reports have 
been issued in June33 and December 2016.34 Even over the short time relocation has been in 
operation, that threshold has produced different eligible nationalities. When the Council 
Decisions were adopted, the main nationalities eligible for relocation were Syria, Iraq, and 
Eritrea.35 At the first update (Q3-2015), the nationalities eligible for relocation were: Bahrain, 
Central African Republic, Eritrea, Iraq, Syria, Swaziland, and Yemen.36 The Commission’s 
Ninth Report indicated that the current nationals eligible for relocation are those from 
Burundi, Eritrea, Maldives, Oman, Qatar, Syria and Yemen.37 Iraqis are no longer eligible for 
relocation, although the Commission states that ‘although some nationalities are no longer 
eligible for relocation, this does not affect those already identified as persons in possible need 
for international protection (e.g., those pre-registered can still be relocated).’38   
 
However, looking at aggregate recognition rates across the EU obscures the divergences in 
recognition rates among Member States. For instance, according to UNHCR in 2014, only 
15% of new asylum applications by Eritreans in France resulted in recognition. In Hungary 
the percentage for Eritreans was 49%, but in Austria 100%.39 The UNHCR statistics reveal a 
similar range for Syrian refugee recognition rates in 2014: positive decisions in 64% of first 
instance applications in Italy, 74% in Greece, 65% in Hungary, but 100% in Poland. More 
recent statistics are not available from UNHCR, but the situations in both Eritrea and Syria 
have not improved substantially since 2014.  
 
These disparities highlight a number of issues regarding the use of a composite past 
recognition rate for relocation. First, past recognition rates may not register changes of 
circumstances. If the aim is to identify asylum-seekers with a ‘clear need of international 
                                                 
32 According to EUROSTAT in the ranking of countries of origin of asylum seekers in respect of whom decisions were 
taken in the 3rd quarter 2016 were stateless http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:First_instance_decisions_by_outcome_and_recognition_rates,_30_main_citizenships_of_
asylum_applicants_granted_decisions_in_the_EU-28,_3rd_quarter_2016.png accessed 3 February 2017 this may 
be an indication of disputed nationality.  
33 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:First_instance_decisions_by_outcome_and_recognition_rates,_30_main_citizenships_of_
asylum_applicants_granted_decisions_in_the_EU-28,_3rd_quarter_2016.png accessed 23 January 2016. 
 
34 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_quarterly_report accessed 23 January 2017 
35 European Commission, First Report on Relocation and Resettlement, COM(2016) 165, 16 March 
36 European Commission, Second Report on Relocation and Resettlement, COM(2016) 222, 12 April 2016. 
37 European Commission, Ninth Report on Relocation and Resettlement, COM(2017) 74 final,  February 2017, p. 2, 
n. 5.  
38 Ibid. 
39 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2014 table 13 http://www.unhcr.org/56655f4b3.html accessed 23 January 2017. 
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protection’, past recognition rates may not be an accurate proxy. Secondly, where those 
fleeing are at risk due to their membership of ethnic, religious or status, nationality alone will 
not be a clear indicator. Thirdly, using an EU average means that whether a particular 
nationality becomes eligible for relocation depends on where past asylum-seekers from that 
nationality group apply for asylum. If the majority of Syrian asylum seekers arriving in the 
EU sought protection in Hungary, for instance, then the 75% threshold would not have been 
achieved. Finally, relocation of asylum seekers on the basis of their nationality to Member 
States with low recognition rates for their country, e.g. Syrians to Hungary instead of Poland, 
may result in unfair outcomes, in that more of the applications are likely to be refused in 
Hungary than in Poland. A Syrian asylum seeker relocated from Greece to Hungary will lose 
9% of his or her chance to receive protection (from a state with a protection rate of 74% to 
one of 65%). Alternatively, a Syrian relocated from Greece to Poland will benefit from a 100% 
protection rate in Poland.  
 
The first Relocation Decision states at preamble 30 that ‘[c]onsidering that an applicant does 
not have the right under EU law to choose the Member State responsible for his or her 
application, the applicant should have the right to an effective remedy against the relocation 
decision…only in view of ensuring respect for his or her fundamental rights’. Thus, the asylum 
seeker has no opportunity to choose the relocation State and is at the mercy of the EU system 
whether he or she will be relocated to Hungary or to Poland, which may have very different 
outcomes for the person concerned.   
 
1.3. Relocation rights and obligations and procedures 
 
According to Article 6 of the 14 September Decision, there are three rights and one obligation 
for asylum seekers being relocated. First, the principle of best interests of the child must be 
a primary consideration; second, Member States must ensure that family members are 
relocated to the same Member State; and third, Italy or Greece must notify the person 
subject to a relocation decision in writing, specifying where he or she is going to be sent, and 
this must happen before the relocation takes place. The obligation is for an asylum seeker to 
stay in the Member State allocated to him or her (or return immediately to it if he or she has 
strayed into another Member State). As noted at the outset, the best (and fundamental rights 
compliant) way to ensure that asylum seekers stay in a Member State is to enable him or 
her to go to the State where he or she wants to go. If asylum-seekers cannot be offered their 
first choice, then preference-matching systems can be designed. To be fair and workable, 
any system must afford asylum-seekers clear, transparent, and reliable information to inform 
their decisions. Unfortunately, as explored in Chapter 3, this has not always been the case 
with relocation in practice as yet. 
 
Textbox 2: The Basics of Preference Matching 
 
Preference matching allows asylum seekers choice over where they are to be protected and 
enables States to manage the sharing of responsibility for granting asylum in a way which is 
equitable and efficient. Preference matching works well in many areas, including tertiary 
education, within the Erasmus and other EU student mobility programmes. These systems 
work fairly well and there is only minor ‘secondary movement’ – the great concern of Member 
States in the asylum field.  
  
The economic theories and practical experience of preference matching demonstrate that 
such systems can work as long as (i) countries or local areas can state their quotas clearly 
and at the same time and (ii) data on refugees and local areas capacities can be processed 
centrally. If these two conditions are satisfied, it is possible to conceive of a number of 
effective and efficient ways to relocate asylum seekers from Greece and Italy across the rest 
of Europe. For example, one could simply maximise the total number of relocated asylum 
seekers or relocated families. Another fruitful approach is to use stated priorities of countries 
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or local areas (e.g. over skills or language ability) and stated preferences of the refugees 
(over the sorts of the local areas in which they think they would thrive) in a matching system. 
The advantage of the matching system approach is that it can reveal valuable information 
about the wishes and ambitions of refugees and the priorities of countries / local areas and 
can therefore substantially increase the number of apt matches between asylum seekers and 
local areas. 
See further: W Jones, A Teytelboym ‘Choices, preferences and priorities in a matching system for refugees’ (2016) 
Forced Migration Review, available at: http://www.fmreview.org/destination-europe/jones-teytelboym.html  
 
The relocation procedure set out in Article 5 of the first Relocation Decision requires 
cooperation between Italy and Greece, EASO and the other Member States to achieve 
relocation. Italy and Greece are required to identify asylum seekers eligible for relocation, 
register them, and make them available to potential receiving states. Article 5(7) provides 
that Member States retain the right to refuse to relocate asylum applicants only where there 
are reasonable grounds for regarding them as a danger to their national security or public 
order or where there are serious ground for applying exclusion provisions in the Qualification 
Directive. Unfortunately, as discussed in Chapter 2, some national authorities appear to be 
using ‘national security’ without explanation, which does not meet the EU general 
requirements to give reasons and respect the principle of legality (Article 41 CFR).   
 
Relocation is intended to take place rapidly, so time limits are ideally within two months from 
the time of indication given by the relocation State, though there are possibilities for 
extensions. A financial incentive is provided to relocation states of EUR 6,000 per relocated 
asylum seeker (Article 10).  
 
1.4. Modifications introduced by the second Relocation Decision and 
the amending Decision 
 
The second Relocation Decision’s main purpose was to increase the numbers of persons and 
introduce a relocation key to designate Member State responsibility. It also introduced a new 
incentive for Italy and Greece of financial support in the form of €500 per asylum seeker 
relocated. The second Relocation Decision includes, for the first time, two Annexes, which 
set out how many asylum seekers should be relocated from Italy and Greece to each of the 
other Member States according to a distribution key. According to the Commission’s 
proposal,40 the distribution key is based on the following elements:  
 
a)  the size of the population (40%) as it reflects the capacity to absorb a certain number of 
refugees;  
b)  total GDP (40%) as it reflects the absolute wealth of a country and is thus indicative for 
the capacity of an economy to absorb and integrate refugees;  
c)  average number of spontaneous asylum applications and the number of resettled refugees 
per 1 million inhabitants over the period 2010-2014 (10%) as it reflects the efforts made by 
Member States in the recent past;  
d)  unemployment rate (10%) as an indicator reflecting the capacity to integrate refugees.  
 
According to the European Commission, as of 2 February 2017, 11, 966 asylum seekers had 
been relocated under the scheme.41 In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, we examine the factors that 
have affected the relocation rates across the EU.  
 
                                                 
40  https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_annex_en.pdf 
accessed 23 January 2017. 
41 European Commission, Ninth report on relocation and resettlement, COM (2017) 74 final, 8 February 2017. 
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On 29 September 2016, the Council adopted an amending Decision, which permits Member 
States to meet their relocation obligations under the 22 September 2015 Relocation Decision, 
by admitting Syrian nationals present in Turkey under national or multilateral legal admission 
schemes for persons in clear need of international protection (but outside the resettlement 
scheme set up by the Council on 20 July 2015). The objective is to expedite the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016.42 The counter effect is to 
diminish the number of persons a Member State is committed to admitting under the 22 
September relocation Decision by the number of persons resettled from Turkey. It applies to 
persons admitted from Turkey to a Member State from 1 May 2016.   
 
  
                                                 
42  EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.  
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CHAPTER 2: RELOCATION IN PRATICE 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 
• Although the Relocation Decisions are legally binding, some Member States 
have effectively failed to comply with them. These include the Member States 
that voted against their adoption in the Council (Hungary, Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia), and a number of others where practical and political challenges against 
relocation have emerged.  
• The States on track to meet their relocation commitments are Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta and Finland. Those that are not relocating at all 
include Austria, Hungary and Poland.   
• Hungary and Slovakia brought a legal challenge against the Relocation Decision, 
but legal experts view the arguments raised therein as relatively weak. Notably, the 
applicant States did not ask the CJEU to suspend the operation of the Decision pending 
its ruling, so it remains fully in force. 
• Hungary, Austria, and Poland have not relocated any asylum seekers, although 
Austria has been granted a suspension relating to 30% of its relocation quota. 
• Aside from outright defiance of the Relocation Decisions, the most common form of 
non-compliance has been the failure to pledge or provide sufficient (or in some 
cases any) relocation places. 
• Even where relocation places are made available, receiving States have frequently 
rejected applications for relocation in a questionable manner, either by citing 
‘national security’ (a ground permitted in the Relocation Decisions) without 
explanation; or invoking grounds not permitted in the Relocation Decisions, or simply 
rejecting the application without giving reasons. 
• The explanations for varying degrees of compliance with the Relocation 
Decisions lie in varying degrees of 1) political support; 2) reception and 
processing capacity, in particular for vulnerable applicants and 3) 
perceptions regarding security threats posed by applications for relocation. 
• In both Italy and Greece, the main challenges to the effective working of relocation 
are external. These include the lack of available places for relocation, in 
particular for unaccompanied minors; frequent rejections on unexplained 
national security grounds and grounds such as public health not envisaged in the 
Relocation Decisions. 
• In Italy, the main internal challenges include lack of preparedness and 
understanding of relocation amongst relevant agencies; lack of coordination 
between relevant agencies; and cumbersome procedures that often involve the 
moving asylum-seekers three times across different reception facilities. 
• In Greece, the main internal challenges include lack of administrative capacity, 
in particular when relocation was first introduced; lack of coordination between 
relevant agencies; and over-centralised procedures that fail to reach asylum 
seekers who have been dispersed across the mainland. 
• The result is that asylum seekers lack information on relocation, and are often 
left waiting, frustrated, and anxious.  
• Stakeholders have also identified problems with the normative content of the 
Relocation Decisions, in particular the use of the nationality criterion to determine 
eligibility, the interaction with the Dublin System, and the failure to accommodate 
asylum seekers’ preferences. The lack of individual redress was also identified as 
a source of unfairness. 
 
This chapter presents the implementation so far of the two Relocation Decisions of September 
2015. First, it focuses on the perspective of the receiving States. The rationale or this focus 
is that they are the source of the main problem with the system, namely the lack of relocation 
places being made available. Then it turns to relocation on the ground in Italy and Greece. 
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As outlined in Chapter 1, in total 160,000 asylum-seekers are to be relocated. According to 
the first Relocation Decision, 24,000 asylum-seekers should be relocated from Italy and 
16,000 from Greece. The second Relocation Decision required the relocation of another 
15,600 applicants from Italy, 50,400 applicants from Greece, and a further 24,000 to be 
allocated. Although the Commission had originally proposed relocation from Hungary, this 
became politically unnecessary.43  The relocation of asylum-seekers from Hungary was later 
abandoned, and according to the 2016 Decision, Member States may use these 54,000 places 
to resettle Syrians from Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey Statement.44  
 
2.1. Compliance, semi-compliance and non-compliance amongst 
States obliged to relocate45 
 
Figure 1 shows that the top ten relocators in total numbers are France (2,696 relocations), 
Germany (1,349 relocations), the Netherlands (1,274 relocations), Portugal (922), Finland 
(919 relocations), Spain (745 relocations), Romania (558 relocations), Ireland (241 
relocations), Lithuania (229 relocations), and Luxemburg (226 relocations). Norway (493 
relocations) and Switzerland (368 relocations), two Schengen associated States that agreed 
to take part in the relocation scheme through bilateral agreements also figure among the top 
relocators.  
 
Figure 1: Top 10 relocators in total (plus 2 associated States) 
 
 
 
Member States that have the lowest relocation numbers in total (see Figure 2) are Poland, 
Austria, and Hungary, which have each not resettled any asylum-seekers, Slovakia (9 
relocations), Liechtenstein (10 relocations), Croatia (19 relocations), Bulgaria (29 
relocations), Sweden (39 relocations), Cyprus (65 relocations), and Estonia (78 relocations). 
 
 
Figure 2: Last 10 relocators in total 
                                                 
43  Commission Proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international 
protection for the benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary, Brussels, 9.9.2015 COM(2015) 451 final.  
44 Council of the European Union, Council Decision (EU) 2016/1754 of 29 September 2016 amending Decision (EU) 
2015/1601 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and 
Greece, OJ L 268, 1.10.2016, p. 82–84. 
45 For the overall numbers, please consult Tables 5 and 6 in the annex. All numbers used in this section are based 
on the European Commission’s Report on Member States’ Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism (as of 25 
January 2017).   
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However, focusing on the total numbers relocated obscures the relative commitments of the 
Member States. Looking at the relative shares, some of the smaller Member States are, in 
fact, doing particularly well (see Table 1). The associated States again score very high in 
fulfilling their commitments. Liechtenstein has relocated the 10 asylum-seekers it has agreed 
to take, Norway has relocated half of its share, and Switzerland 34.1%. (However, it should 
be noted that Switzerland has kept making use of the Dublin take back/take charge 
mechanisms to send refugees elsewhere, including Italy.46) Very small countries like Malta 
and Luxemburg have relocated 61.1% (Malta) or 40.6% (Luxemburg) of their share. Finland 
and Ireland again score relatively highly, with 44.2% (Finland) and 40.2% (Ireland) of their 
relocation places filled. Also, Latvia (41.1%), Lithuania (34.1%), and Portugal (31.2%) do 
well.  
  
Table 1: Top 10 relocators among Member States (plus 3 associated States) in 
relative terms 
Member State Relocated Responsibilty Percentage 
(Liechtenstein) 10 10 100.0% 
Malta 80 131 61.1% 
(Norway) 493 995 49.5% 
Finland 919 2078 44.2% 
Latvia 197 481 41.0% 
Luxemburg 226 557 40.6% 
Ireland 241 600 40.2% 
Lithuania 229 671 34.1% 
(Switzerland) 368 1080 34.1% 
Portugal 922 2951 31.2% 
                                                 
46 ECRE, Admissibility, responsibility and safety in European asylum procedures, AIDA Report (September 2016), p. 
24 ff. 
010
2030
4050
6070
8090
Implementation of the 2015 Council Decisions establishing provisional measures in the area of international 
protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
27 
Estonia 78 329 23.7% 
Slovenia 124 567 21.9% 
Netherlands 1274 5947 21.4% 
 
Poland, Hungary and Austria have not relocated any asylum-seekers so far. The Czech 
Republic has only relocated 0.4% of its share and Slovakia has relocated 1.0%. Croatia and 
Bulgaria have relocated 2.0% and 2.2% respectively. Interestingly, also three Member States 
that have usually taken an active role on refugee protection in Europe, namely Sweden 
(1.0%), Germany (4.9%) and Belgium (5.4%), figure among the slowest relocators (see 
Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Last 10 relocators among Member States in relative terms 
Member State Relocated Responsibilty Percentage 
Poland 0 6128 0% 
Austria 0 1953 0% 
Hungary 0 1294 0% 
Czech Republic 12 2691 0.4% 
Slovakia 9 902 1.0% 
Sweden 39 3766 1.0% 
Croatia 19 968 2.0% 
Bulgaria 29 1302 2.2% 
Germany 1349 27536 4.9% 
Belgium 206 3812 5.4% 
 
According to the Commission, only Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, and 
Finland are expected to meet their obligations in time and two associated States, Switzerland 
and Norway, will meet them even ahead of schedule.47 
 
For relocation to work properly, Member States should pledge relocation places swiftly. In 
the latest Commission report, Member States have been asked to make substantial pledges 
every month to meet the target of relocation 2,000 asylum-seekers monthly from Greece 
and 1,000 asylum-seekers from Italy.48 The Italian and Greek authorities may then act upon 
these pledges and send proposals for potential candidates.49 The associated States have 
bilaterally agreed with the EU to take part in the relocation scheme. The share of asylum-
seekers they are allocated is not based on a distribution key, but on their voluntary 
commitment to relocate a specific share, previously decided (see Table 3). Thus, the 
associated States have made all their formal pledges right from the beginning of the process. 
Among the others, Ireland, that opted into relocation unlike Denmark and the UK, has 
pledged 85.7% of its share, followed by the Baltic States, Lithuania (82.0%) and Latvia 
                                                 
47 European Commission, Ninth report on relocation and resettlement, COM (2017) 74 final, 8 February 2017, p. 2-
3 
48 Ibid., p. 3-4. 
49 Natascha Zaun, Telephone Interview Official A, (Oxford, 14 February 2017). 
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(81.9%); Estonia has still pledged 63.8% of its share. But, again, countries like Malta, Finland 
and Portugal figure among those Member States that have pledged a majority of their share.    
 
Table 3: Top 10 pledgers in relative terms 
Member State Pledges  Responsibility Percentage 
(Norway) 995 995 100.0% 
(Switzerland) 1080 1080 100.0% 
(Liechtenstein) 10 10 100.0% 
Ireland 514 600 85.7% 
Lithuania 550 671 82.0% 
Latvia 394 481 81.9% 
Malta 99 131 75.6% 
Finland 1420 2078 68.3% 
Estonia 210 329 63.8% 
Portugal 1618 2951 54.8% 
Luxemburg 270 557 48.5% 
Cyprus 140 320 43.8% 
Romania 1702 4180 40.7% 
 
Two of the Member States (Austria and Hungary) that have not relocated any asylum-seekers 
have not made any pledges either. Poland, which has not relocated for the past six months, 
did, however, initially make 100 pledges. These pledges had been submitted in December 
2015, but were subsequently suspended by Poland in April 2016, thus freezing the relocation 
procedure from Italy and Greece.50 The other two Visegrád countries, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, had only pledged 1.9% and 3.3% of their share. Croatia has pledged less than 5% 
of its share, Spain less than 10%, and Belgium and Germany have pledged less than 20% of 
their shares.   
 
Table 4: Last 10 pledgers in relative terms 
Member State Pledges  Responsibility Percentage 
Austria 0 1953 0.0% 
Hungary 0 1294 0.0% 
Sweden 50 3766 1.3% 
Poland 100 6128 1.6% 
Czech Republic 50 2691 1.9% 
Slovakia 30 902 3.3% 
Croatia 46 968 4.8% 
                                                 
50 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council 
and the Council. Eight report on relocation and resettlement’, COM(2016) 791 final, 8 December 2016, p. 7. 
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Spain 900 9323 9.7% 
Belgium 530 3812 13.9% 
Germany 5250 27536 19.1% 
 
2.2. Explaining good and bad performances in relocating states 
 
Some Member States have not implemented the Relocation Decisions at all (Austria, Poland, 
Hungary) or implemented it very slowly (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Sweden). It is difficult to 
isolate the precise reasons for the variable compliance rates with relocation. There appears 
to be no common political framing of the ‘refugee crisis’ as being a common European 
problem.  Our research suggests that the degree of compliance is influenced by the 
variation in 1) political support for relocation; 2) administrative and reception 
capacity; and 3) perceptions regarding security threats posed by applications for 
relocation. 
 
Although the degree of political commitment cannot entirely explain the slow relocation 
process in all or even most Member States, it has significant explanatory value. In particular, 
some States have raised overt political, legal and ideological objections to the concept 
and practice of relocation. These States have tended to have right-wing authoritarian 
governments. Some other States are not relocating as they seem to have genuine lack of 
reception and processing capacity. For some others, security concerns have emerged. 
In the case of the latter two issues, it is difficult to verify independently the nature and 
cogency of the objections, a matter we address further in the recommendations. 
 
2.2.1. Political Support for relocation 
 
Some of the reluctant governments have overtly objected to the concept and practice 
of relocation. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia voted against the adoption 
of the Relocation Decisions in the Council, and Hungary and Slovakia have even 
challenged the decision before the CJEU.51 Hungary and Slovakia seem, wrongly, to 
consider the Relocation Decision inapplicable to them. Notably, they did not request the CJEU 
to suspend the application of the impugned Decision, so it remains fully in force. Moreover, 
legal experts have tended to view the legal arguments raised by the applicant States 
as weak.52  
 
Zero relocation from Hungary might not be surprising, as Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán 
had displayed strong anti-refugee and Eurosceptic attitudes,53 and objected to relocation 
from the outset. His government held a referendum on the relocation system. The 
                                                 
51 Case C-643/15 and C-647/15 Hungary and Slovakia v Council of the European Union 3 December 2015. 
52 See Steve Peers ‘Relocation of Asylum-Seekers in the EU: Law and Policy’ 24 September 2015’; Marco Di Fillippo 
‘The actions for annulment of the second relocation decisions and the poor implementation of the scheme: the 
margins for reaffirming the rule of law’ (2016) IIHL Policy Paper No 2; Kees Groenendijk and Boldizsar Nagy, 
‘Hungary’s appeal against relocation to the CJEU: upfront attack or rear guard battle?’, (16 December 2015) 
available at http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/hungarys-appeal-against-relocation-to-the-cjeu-upfront-attack-or-rear-
guard-battle/. 
53 Levy Gale, Sadie, ‘Hungarian prime minister calls migrants entering Europe a poison’, The Independent, August 
2016, available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-hungary-migrants-europe-
prime-minister-viktor-orban-asylum-seekers-a7157871.html. Ian Traynore, Hungary to hold referendum one EU’s 
refugee quotas, The Guardian, 24 February 2016, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/24/hungary-viktor-orban-will-call-referendum-on-eu-refugee-
quotas. 
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government’s information leaflet framed relocation as ‘coerced settlement’ that would 
‘increase the terror threat’, with illustrations showing number of victims of the recent Paris, 
Brussels and Nice attacks.54 In the words of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights, the campaign ‘demonized’ refugees, ‘portrayed migrants as a danger to the 
Hungarian society’ and promoted ‘deceptive messages’.55 Most who voted (98%) rejected 
relocation and supported the government’s position, but the low turnout of 43.9% meant it 
was not valid, as the Constitution required a 50% quorum.56 Nonetheless, Prime Minister 
Orbán signalled his intention to propose a constitutional amendment to give effect to the 
referendum result.57 
 
The Prime Minister of Slovakia, Robert Fico had also Stated that ‘Islam ha[d] no place in 
Slovakia’, highlighting that Slovakia was not open to receiving refugees from this cultural 
background.58 The October 2015 change in government in Poland has also brought a change 
in attitude to relocation. Poland was among the Member States that were critical of the 
relocation agreement initially, but did not vote against it. In October 2015, the national 
conservative Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS; Law and Justice) party came into power. After the 
terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, the Polish Minister for European Affairs, 
Konrad Szymánsik, said ‘[i]n the face of the tragic acts in Paris, we do not see the political 
possibilities to implement [this]’,59 also suggesting that Muslims were considered raising the 
level of danger of terrorism. Overall, the rise in right-wing populism and authoritarianism in 
various European countries mobilising anti-immigrant sentiment present in countries that 
have only experienced immigration recently has entailed the orchestrated stigmatisation of 
and hostility towards asylum seekers and refugees. These governments use security 
concerns to justify their lack of commitment to EU relocation. 60 Yet, their reluctance to 
accept the relocation decision long before the terrorist attacks in Paris highlights that this is 
mainly a pretext.    
 
Relocation is framed very differently in other States, which have been more compliant with 
the Relocation Decisions. For example, in Ireland, a government Minister has underlined 
that a coordinated European response to the humanitarian crisis is needed and highlighted 
that ‘Ireland has always lived up to its international humanitarian obligations and [is] fully 
committed to playing [its] part in addressing the Migration Crisis facing Europe’.61 Another 
government Minister Stated of those being relocated that ‘It is now abundantly clear that the 
people arriving to-date […] have suffered greatly and are made up of people fleeing civil war 
and conflict. Many have suffered terribly, have unaddressed or undiagnosed medical needs 
and many children have never attended school or have missed years of their schooling. They 
                                                 
54  Boldizsar Nagy ‘The aftermath of an invalid referendum on relocation of asylum seekers: a constitutional 
amendment in Hungary’ (10 November 2016) 
Available at http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-aftermath-of-an-invalid-referendum/ 
55 Nils Muiznieks ‘Hungary’s Duty to Refugees’ New York Times, 28 September 2016. 
56 Patrick Kingsley, Hungary’s refugee referendum not valid after voters stay away, The Guardian, 2 October 2016, 
available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/hungarian-vote-on-refugees-will-not-take-place-
suggest-first-poll-results. 
57 ‘Prime Minister Viktor Orbán informs EC President of referendum result via letter’ http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-
prime-minister/news/prime-minister-viktor-orban-informs-ec-president-of-referendum-result-via-letter.  
58 Vince Chadwick, Islam has no place in Slovakia, 27 May 2016, available at: http://www.politico.eu/article/robert-
fico-islam-no-place-news-slovakia-muslim-refugee/. 
59  Ashley Cowburn, Poland says it cannot accept migrants under EU quotas, following attacks in Paris, The 
Independent, November 2015, available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/poland-plans-to-
backtrack-on-migrant-commitment-following-attacks-in-paris-a6734521.html.   
60 Zaun, Natascha, States as Gatekeepers in EU Asylum Politics: Explaining the Failure of a Refugee Quota System. 
Paper presented at the Conference ‘EU refugee policies in crisis’ of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence ‘The EU in 
Global Dialogue’, University of Mainz, 9-10 June 2016.  
61 Irish Department for Justice and Equality, Ireland to accept to 4,000 persons under Relocation and Resettlement 
programmes- Fitzgerald, 10 September 2015, available at: http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR15000463.  
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have lost everything they have ever owned and are arriving on our shores with just the 
clothes on their backs. This is a terribly vulnerable group that need all our help and 
assistance.’62 In spite of this stated political support, Ireland relocation has been slow, and 
it now imposes additional security checks which block relocation from Italy.63 
 
Bulgaria has yet to relocate many asylum seekers, yet Bulgarian Prime Minister Borisov has 
called on Eastern European Member States to show solidarity with the Western European 
partners, saying that ‘[w]hen taxpayers (in richer European countries) give money for 
European solidarity, we are happy. When, however, they have a problem – because the 
migrant flow is mainly headed there – then, in my view, we also have to show solidarity and 
mutual aid’.64 
 
While in some States, support for relocation seems to depend on strong political leadership 
at the national level, in others grassroots, local and regional actors have demanded greater 
support for refugees, including through relocation. For example, a recent demonstration in 
Barcelona urged Spain to fulfil its duties under the relocation agreement.65 Spain has not 
relocated many asylum seekers as yet, for domestic political reasons (repeated general 
elections,66 corruption scandals,67 and instability over the past year)68 but like Bulgaria, 
appears to be stepping up its pledges. In other effective states of relocation, such as Finland 
(as discussed in the next section) relocation does not appear to have a high political salience, 
receiving little media coverage.69  
 
While a lack of support from the public for receiving additional asylum-seekers and refugees 
is often cited as a reason for the hesitance to receive additional asylum-seekers, public 
opinion on refugee issues is generally supportive of protection according to States’ 
reception capacity. Research has shown that, generally, voters prefer a capacity-based 
distribution key over the Dublin system, even if this implies that their respective Member 
State will have to receive additional asylum seekers.70 Moreover, it has been suggested that 
negative attitudes towards refugees are on the decline in every European country.71 This 
does not imply that citizens are completely uncritical of recent arrivals. In fact, 54% of the 
                                                 
62 Irish Government Press Release : ‘Tánaiste and Minister Stanton outline progress on Ireland’s commitments under 
refugee relocation and resettlement programmes’ 5 October 2016, 
http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/pressrelease-refugee-relocation-and-resettlement-programmes051016  
63 ‘Italy: security checks by Irish police blocks relocation of refugees’, ECRE News, 13 January 2017, available at: 
http://www.ecre.org/italy-security-checks-by-irish-police-blocks-relocation-of-refugees/  
64 Novinite.com, Bulgaria’s PM Calls for EU Solidarity on Refugee Relocation Quota’s. 5 May 2016. Availabale at: 
http://www.novinite.com/articles/174342/Bulgaria's+PM+Calls+for+EU+Solidarity+on+Refugee+Relocation+Quot
as.  
65 The Guardian, Protestors in Barcelona urge Spain to take in more refugees, 18 February 2017, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/18/protesters-in-barcelona-urge-spain-to-take-in-more-refugees. 
66 ‘Spanish elections: renewed deadlock beckons as no party wins majority’, The Guardian, 27 June 2016, available 
at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/26/spanish-elections-exit-polls-show-deadlock-likely-to-
continue.  
67  ‘Corruption scandals threaten Mariano Rajoy’s future’, Financial Times, 16 February 2016, available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/1f98d546-d3e4-11e5-829b-8564e7528e54; ‘Spanish politicians in court over 
corruption case billed as trial of the year’, The Guardian, 4 October 2016, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/04/spanish-politicians-court-corruption-case-trial-year.  
68  ‘Spain's Socialists vote to allow Rajoy minority government’, BBC News, 23 October 2016, available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37744078.   
69 E-mail NGO B, 16 February 2017. Natascha Zaun, Skype Interview with NGO A (Oxford, 13 February 2017).   
70 Bansak, Kirk, Hainmueller, Jens, Hanggartner, Dominik, Aristotelian Equality and International Cooperation: 
Europeans Prefer a Proportional Asylum Regime, Stanford-Zurich Immigration Policy Lab Working Paper Series, No. 
16-02. 
71 Hatton, Timothy, “Immigration, public opinion and the recession in Europe.” Economic Policy 86(2016): 205-246. 
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respondents think that criteria for refugee status should not be interpreted too generously.72 
When asylum seekers are portrayed as ‘illegal immigrants’, attitudes are rather critical.73 
This research underlines the significant impact of political and public discourse, and crucially 
framing, on public opinion.  
 
2.2.2. Administrative and reception capacity  
 
Research has shown that administrative capacity is an important factor explaining why 
some Member States implement EU asylum policy more effectively than others.74 Member 
States where asylum applications increased significantly in 2015 have faced more problems 
implementing the relocation agreement. In particular, there may well be instances where 
there is genuinely a lack of reception and processing capacity. However, this finding is 
subject to a significant caveat. At present, there is no reliable assessment of States’ 
reception capacity. Moreover, the crucial determinant of when places become available is 
when recognised refugees move out of reception centres and into normal accommodation. 
As was stressed in a previous study to the European Parliament, there are two hallmarks of 
a well-run reception and processing system, namely ‘chain management’ of the reception 
and processing system, and flexibility to ensure that reception capacity can be expanded in 
times of higher demand.75    
 
While this section accepts that previous high demand for asylum may lead to reluctance to 
relocate, due to lack of reception capacity, that remains a hypothesis rather than a proven 
fact. In some cases, there may be mismanagement of the asylum system, leading to 
lack of reception places. Or States may simply claim to lack places – there is no EU 
mechanism to check the availability of reception spaces. In contrast in many other 
fields, the EU does examine the workings of the decentralised administration of EU law.  For 
instance, regarding effective border management, the European Border and Coast Guard 
(EBCG) conducts ‘stress tests’ to assess how national border controls are working. 76    Similar 
mechanisms of transparency and best practice guidance could be developed to help assess 
the efficacy of reception and processing systems. 
 
Sweden is the top recipient (per capita) of asylum-seekers in the EU, followed by Austria. 
Both States have been granted temporary suspensions of their relocation commitments. In 
Sweden, the numbers of asylum applications increased by 60% from November 2014 to 
November 2015,77 and in Austria applications increased by 230% from November 2014 to 
November 2015.78 Additionally, both countries were engaged in resettlement. In June 2016, 
                                                 
72 Bertelsmann, EU citizens want a fair distribution of refugees, Press Release, 16 February 2016, available at: 
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/press/press-releases/press-release/pid/eu-citizens-want-a-fair-
distribution-of-refugees/. 
73 Hatton, Timothy, “Immigration, public opinion and the recession in Europe.” Economic Policy 86(2016): 205-246. 
74 Zaun, Natascha, EU Asylum Policies. The Power of Strong Regulating States, Palgrave Macmillan 2016, p. 190, 
216-222. 
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different Member States. 
76 European Commission, Securing Europe’s external borders: Launch of the European Borader and Coast Guard 
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Sweden was therefore granted a one-year suspension from contributing to relocation.79 This 
explains its rather low relocation rates of 1% to date.80  
 
Austria,81 in contrast, was granted a 30% suspension on its relocation obligation. In contrast 
to the Swedish authorities, the Austrian government did not make any efforts to relocate the 
remaining 70%, nor did it resettle anyone from Turkey.82 However, Council Decision (EU) 
2015/1601 is binding for all Member States and Austria should work towards its obligations. 
Some of the measures adopted by Austria in response to the large numbers of arrivals in 
2015 appear to breach EU and international law, notably its annual refugee quota.83 While it 
certainly experienced a large increase in asylum seekers, its responses suggests a political 
backlash, as well as genuine concerns about lack of reception capacity. Politically, an Austrian 
minister expressed concern that relocation would trigger greater arrivals of asylum seekers 
to Italy and Greece, and so exacerbate rather than solve the refugee crisis.84   
 
In total numbers, Germany was the top recipient of asylum-seekers in 2015 with 890,000 
applications. 85  Since then, asylum decisions are severely backlogged with 200,000 to 
250,000 pending cases in 2017.86 With delayed processes, places in reception centres are 
blocked, making it harder to use these for relocation purposes.  
 
The cases of Austria, Sweden, and Germany show that Member States with significant 
rapid increases in asylum applications may face lack of reception capacity to support 
relocation. In contrast, Member States, such as Finland, that are doing comparatively well 
in relocation also do so, because they have sufficient space in reception centres. The good 
performance of Finland may be surprising, as Finland had initially been more hesitant and 
abstained in the vote on the second Relocation Decision. In addition, in a further gesture of 
neighbourly solidarity, in 2015, Finland had received 30,000 Iraqi applicants who had come 
to Finland from Sweden. Finland had processed their applications swiftly and hence could 
benefit from a significant number of available places in the relocation process.87 The Finnish 
examples confirms that administrative capacity is key to effectiveness in the provision of 
refugee protection. Finland was able to process many spontaneous asylum applications, 
apparently ensuring that asylum seekers stays in reception centres were relatively short,, 
and so became an effective relocator also. It also accepts unaccompanied minors for 
relocation, in contrast to many other Member States. 
 
                                                 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, OJ L 74, 19.3.2016, p. 36–37, 
p. 36. 
79 Survey, Official C, 20 February 2017.  
80 Council of the European Union, Council Decision (EU) 2016/946.  
81 Council of the European Union, Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/408 of 10 March 2016.   
82 Die Presse, ‘Österreich nimmt derzeit keine Flüchtlinge über EU-Türkei-Deal auf‘, 12 July 2016, available at: 
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EUTuerkeiDeal-auf.  
83  ‘Austria's rapid reversal in refugee policy’, Deutsche Welle, 3 March 2016, available at: 
http://www.dw.com/en/austrias-rapid-reversal-in-refugee-policy/a-19092684; AIDA Country Report: Austria 
(2016) http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_at_2016update.pdf.  
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Fluechtlingspolitik.html.  
85  Bundesministerium des Inneren, 890,000 Asylsuchende im Jahr 2015, 30 September 2016, available at: 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2016/09/asylsuchende-2015.html. 
86  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 250.000 unerledigte Asylanträge, 29 September 2016, available at: 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/fluechtlingskrise/bamf-nimmt-250-000-unerledigte-asylantraege-in-2017-mit-
14459055.html. 
87 Natascha Zaun, Telephone Interview with Official A, (Oxford, 14 February 2017). 
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Some smaller Member States indicate that they struggle particularly with the provision of 
sufficient accommodation88 or that there were initial struggles related to the establishment 
of cooperation channels.89 Some Member States such as Finland and Cyprus claim to lack 
interpreters, particularly for Eritrean refugees.90 In Estonia stakeholders report a lack of 
Kurdish interpreters.91 In Cyprus, asylum seekers have complained about the length of the 
asylum procedure and the low quality of accommodation, yet, highlighting that conditions 
were still better than in Italy.92  
 
2.2.3. Reception Challenges for Vulnerable Asylum Seekers  
 
Receiving States also report particular problems finding reception places for vulnerable 
asylum seekers, in particular those who are ill, and for unaccompanied minors. Luxemburg 
reports that relocation of large families (5+) is difficult due to the lack of adequate 
accommodation. 93  In Estonia meeting the needs of severely ill refugees presents a 
challenge.94 Generally, the relocation of unaccompanied minors has only progressed very 
slowly. Some governments claim to lack the special reception facilities in Member States 
which are required to host unaccompanied minors,95 or claim their facilities are full.96 In some 
Member States, there have also been problems with minors moving onward irregularly after 
relocation.97 These Member States, therefore, prefer to relocate particularly young children. 
In Ireland, for example, these children are usually placed in foster families and are viewed 
as less likely to disappear than older teenagers (over the age of 16), who are usually 
accommodated in larger reception facilities.98  
 
In February 2017, 523 unaccompanied minors have been registered (on top of the 2,200 
estimated to be present in Greece as of 27 January 201799), but only 248 have been relocated 
from Greece. Some receiving States also appear to be using national definitions of 
unaccompanied minors. Only one minor has been relocated from Italy so far. And the 
situation is due to worsen in the near future. Out of the total 28,129 minors arriving in Italy 
in 2016, 91.6% were unaccompanied – including 3,806 Eritrean and 218 Syrian, who would 
qualify for relocation. A further 462 unaccompanied minors have arrived in January 2017.100 
 
2.2.4. Perceptions regarding security threats posed by applications for relocation 
 
The Relocation Decisions permit refusals to relocate on national security grounds. However, 
it appears that many relocation requests are rejected on these grounds, without any 
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89 Survey Official D, 3 March 2017.  
90 Survey, Official E, 2 March 2017. Email NGO B, 16 February 2017.  
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93 Survey Official B, 15 February 2017.  
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95 Survey Official B, 15 February 2017. Survey Official F, 3 March 2017.  
96 ECRE, The implementation of hotspots in Italy and Greece, p. 28. Survey Official E, 2 March 2017. 
97 Survey Official B, 15 February 2017. 
98 Natascha Zaun, Skype Interview with NGO A, (Oxford, 13 February 2017). 
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individual explanation.101  Stakeholders reported dubious rejections on national security 
grounds. For instance, it was reported that some Eritreans were rejected for relocation due 
to their past military service, although it was precisely that compulsory military service from 
which they were fleeing.102 EU general principles of legality and reason-giving (Article 41 
CFR) mean that individual reasons should be given when taking decisions on national 
security or similar grounds. 
 
As well as specifying individual reasons, where an applicant is rejected based on security 
grounds, information should be shared across Member States. Otherwise people in 
whose case there were reasonable grounds to believe that they posed a security threat can 
move around freely in either Italy or Greece.103 And yet, while Europol has offered a 
dedicated secured channel for communication to this effect, it appears it has not yet been 
used to notify grounds for rejection.104 The failure to explain and communicate the individual 
reasons for national security rejections is a breach of the duty of sincere cooperation, 
as if there are genuine security concerns, they should be explained to the host State on 
account of their potential EU/Schengen-wide impact.  
 
While there is some evidence that national security is being invoked spuriously by some 
receiving States, on the other hand, in many States there was a strong and understandable 
political perception that security screenings in Italy and Greece were flawed, and that more 
precautions needed to be taken to meet public concerns after terrorist attacks in 
Europe since 2015.105 Some officials of receiving countries have explained the need for 
additional security screening by referring to the fact that some of the relocation applications 
they received were incomplete.106 This led to the institutional practice of receiving States 
wanting to send their police officers or other security personnel to sending States to conduct 
additional screening interviews. It appears that France led this practice, but now Ireland 
and Estonia also do not currently relocate from Italy as Italian authorities have not allowed 
Irish police officers and the Estonian liaison to conduct special security screenings on Italian 
territory.107 The institutional practice of sending officers to conduct such additional reviews 
has no legal basis, and has met with resistance from Italy.  
 
2.3.  Relocation in practice in Italy and Greece 
 
This Part examines relocation in practice, focusing on the input of stakeholders in Greece and 
Italy. Unsurprisingly given the problems identified in the preceding section, the main 
challenges to the effective workings of relocation are ‘external’, and relate to the lack of 
available places for relocation. In addition, there are also ‘local’ challenges that relate to 
Greek, Italian and EU administrative practices on the ground. Many stakeholders also 
identified problems with the legal design of relocation in terms of its scope and fairness, 
which we categorised as ‘normative’ challenges. 
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2.3.1. External Challenges from Receiving States 
 
The main challenges identified for relocation are similar in both Greece and Italy, although 
they have led to different outcomes, with far more asylum seekers relocated from Greece 
than Italy. This is partly a function of the different nationalities of those arriving in the two 
countries, but also reflects a different prioritisation by receiving states. 
 
The most significant problem is the lack of available relocation places in general. In 
practice, relocation depends on receiving States making available relocation places, which 
they seem to treat as an option, rather than an obligation. As one stakeholder in Italy put it, 
‘relocation is practically not mandatory for receiving States.’ 108  A Greek stakeholder 
commented ‘It is clear that with [many] asylum seekers identified in Greece as candidates 
for the relocation, the delay is not happening here. The stumbling block is the reluctance of 
EU Member States to take the quota of refugees that corresponds to them according to the 
[Relocation Decisions]. So long as this doesn’t happen, people will remain in limbo in Greece 
with frustrations rising and the government/non-governmental sector, being too weak to 
respond appropriately due to this insecurity that makes long term planning impossible.109  
 
This problem is particularly acute when it comes to the lack of relocation places for 
unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable and ‘unwanted’ applicants. Several 
Italian stakeholders identified this problem,110 the extent of which is such that they viewed 
receiving States as having established de facto limitations on the personal scope of the 
Relocation Decisions.111 
 
Stakeholders identified many instances of apparently wrongful rejection of relocation 
requests, in particular on national security grounds. It was reported that in the Greek 
experience, some receiving states impose excessive security checks imposed by. 112  In 
addition, it appears that when receiving States reject applicants on national security grounds, 
they often fail to provide any individualised reasons to the Greek authorities.113 As one 
stakeholder explained ‘The idea that a Member State can reject an applicant based on 
unexplained reasoning goes against the spirit of European union, as the applicant may later 
be accepted by another Member State. If this person is a security risk for one country, aren’t 
they for another? And aren’t they later able to travel in the Schengen zone freely, thereby 
potentially remaining a threat to the State that rejected them in the first place?’114  
 
There have also been challenges with security screening by the Greek authorities. For 
instance, it was reported that the Greek Relocation Unit has cancelled outgoing relocation 
requests on finding ‘hits’ in domestic and European security lists. Reportedly, this has 
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114  Christina Velentza, Written Interview with Fotini Rantsiou Independent humanitarian advisor (Athens, 17 
February 2017). 
Implementation of the 2015 Council Decisions establishing provisional measures in the area of international 
protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
37 
occurred in cases of mistaken identity. 115  Some receiving States conduct additional 
procedures in Greece, even after the ‘matching’ of the applicant to the Member State of the 
relocation, including interviews with the eligible candidates in the Member States’ embassy. 
These are reported to be tantamount to a full asylum procedure, going beyond what is 
envisaged in the Relocation Decisions.116  
 
Stakeholders in Italy also report excessive and unexplained recourse to rejection on security 
grounds,117 and unjustified recourse to rejection grounds not permitted in the Relocation 
Decisions, notably for public health reasons.118 The apparently wide margin of discretion 
allowed to Member States of relocation when interpreting rejection grounds in the Relocation 
Decisions was singled out for criticism.119 On national security in particular, a key stakeholder 
in Italy reported – ‘there is an emerging mutual trust gap in the cooperation with receiving 
States, which can impair the relocation process. The querelle between Italian authorities and 
the national authorities of certain Member States with reference to the security screening is 
a good example of this lack of mutual trust’.120  
 
Relocation is hampered by delays at all stages. Greek stakeholders report delay in 
approvals of relocation requests,121 and in executing transfers.122 Overall, in Greece, it is 
reported that the average time between the registration of an asylum-seeker eligible for 
relocation, and the outgoing request by the relocation unit is 49 days.123 The answer is 
usually received within 29 days, while the transfer reportedly needs another 58 days in order 
to be completed. 124  There are delays in the procedure when the family reunification 
provisions come into play, this leads to frustration and anxiety to several separated families 
in Greece.125 Overall, these waiting periods intensify anxiety and lack of trust in the process. 
Similarly, in Italy, there are frequent delays in receiving relocation pledges, approving Italy’s 
relocation requests, and authorisations to transfer asylum seekers.126 In Italy, this reportedly 
leads to the expiration of pledges and congestion of reception facilities in Italy.127 This 
receiving state practice whereby pledges ‘expire’ has no clear basis in the Relocation 
Decisions. Again, this illustrates that States are treating relocation as a matter of discretion, 
rather than duty.  
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These lack of relocation places, refusals and delays are understood as a manifestation of a 
lack of sincere cooperation and mutual trust in the relocation system.  
 
 
2.3.2. Local Challenges in Greece 
 
The implementation of the Relocation Decisions in Greece altered considerably with the 
closure of the Greek-Macedonian border on 9 March 2016 and then the implementation 
of the EU-Turkey Statement. Although the statement is not a legal instrument, it is treated 
as amending the Relocation Decisions, so that only those present in Greece from 16 
September 2015 until 20 March 2016 (when the EU-Turkey statement came into effect) are 
regarded as eligible for relocation. The legality of this practice is doubtful. The EU-Turkey 
statement is not a legal instrument, so cannot amend the legally binding Relocation 
Decisions. In practice, the Greek authorities maintain this distinction by having transferred 
asylum-seekers from the Greek islands to the mainland before the EU-Turkey statement 
comes in effect and regarding only those on the mainland as eligible for relocation. In 
practice, the implementation of this distinction has led to frustration and clashes on the 
ground.128   
 
A further contextual challenge in Greece is the poor reception conditions. It remains 
unlawful to transfer asylum-seekers back to Greece, based on rulings of both the ECtHR and 
CJEU finding reception conditions there to be inhuman and degrading.129 Although reception 
conditions in some instances have improved, the picture is highly varied.130 Challenges in 
Greece have been hampered by the strains and limitations on key personnel. There are 
now 84 officials working on relocation, mainly in Athens, with some staff also in Thessaloniki 
and Thrace.131 However, the general issue of the limited capacity of the Greek Asylum Service 
remains. 
 
The relocation procedure is over-centralised, given that the asylum seekers who were 
moved from the Greek islands are dispersed across over 40 reception places spread across 
the Greek mainland. However, relocation interviews take place mainly in Athens (with smaller 
offices in Thessaloniki and Thrace), and it appears that officials do not travel frequently to 
conduct procedures where asylum seekers are. It was reported that some asylum seekers in 
more isolated locations were not informed of their rights, or the possibility of applying for 
relocation. 
 
Lack of coordination across different agencies - reception centres, EASO, immigration 
officers and NGOs - is also hampering relocation.132 At the time relocation was launched, 
asylum seekers were still arriving on the Greek islands in large numbers, creating a 
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humanitarian and reception crisis. At that time, providing asylum seekers information on 
rights and procedures was neglected, in favour of moving people to the mainland swiftly. 
With the implementation of the Greek-Macedonian border closure, and the EU-Turkey 
Statement, the context has altered completely, but lack of coordination remains a serious 
problem, leading to confusion amongst asylum seekers who have been transferred to the 
mainland in particular. 
 
Additional administrative problems identified in Greece include incidents of double 
registrations, in both the Dublin family reunification process and the relocation system. 
Unfortunately, it is reported that the responsible officials cancelled both requests, delaying 
further the processing of claims. Applicants were required to reapply from the beginning.  
 
2.3.3. Local Challenges in Italy 
 
The main challenges identified with reference to Italian administrative practices are: 
 
Stakeholders reported widespread unpreparedness across all agencies, including local 
immigration offices, asylum services and reception centre management. 133 This creates 
delays and uncertainty amongst asylum seekers on the functioning and duration of the 
procedure.134 As one NGO stakeholder explained, ‘The first word asylum seekers learn in 
Italian is “aspetta” (wait)’. 135  
 
There is a lack of effective coordination across these relevant agencies, including local 
immigration offices, asylum services and reception centre management. 136  The lack of 
coordination also includes international and EU bodies. For instance, there is duplication of 
unnecessary checks and controls with a consequent waste of time and resources (e.g. 
secondary health screenings by IOM137 and secondary security checks by Europol).138Actors 
appear to lack an accurate and shared understanding of the relocation procedure, and their 
role therein. This problem has not been fully addressed by the adoption of the Italian Road 
Map and the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). 139  Stakeholders also attribute 
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136 Daniela Vitiello, Unofficial Summary of a meeting with NGO networks on relocation challenges in Italy (Rome, 9 
February 2017). 
137 Daniela Vitiello, Face-to-Face Interview with Simona Spinelli, DU (Rome, 8 February 2017): ‘The European 
Commission concluded an agreement with IOM, tasked with second pre-departure health screening to each asylum 
seeker. […] The DG Home opted for this generalised second medical screening to meet public health concerns of 
receiving Member States.’ 
138 On the involvement of Europol, recently formalised through the Relocation Protocol for Italy, see Daniela Vitiello, 
Telephone Interview with Officials A and B, UNHCR (Rome, 16 February 2017); Daniela Vitiello, Written Interview 
with Caterina Bove, ASGI (Rome, 21 February 2017). This Relocation Protocol, which is not public, was first 
announced in the Seventh report on relocation and resettlement (COM(2016) 720 final, 9.11.2016, p. 3) and 
mentioned in the Eighth report on relocation and resettlement (COM(2016) 791 final, 8.12.2016, p. 4). As specified 
in the Ninth report on relocation and resettlement (COM(2017) 74 final, 8.2.2017, p. 4), it allows Europol teams to 
conduct ‘joint security interviews’. The first interview by Europol, Norwegian and Italian officers took place in the 
first half of February 2017.  
139  Cf. Italian Ministry of the Interior, Italian Roadmap, 28 September 2015, available at 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/ministry_of_interior_roadmap_for_relocation.pdf; 
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coordination problems to the continued arrival of asylum seekers, and limitations of the 
current mandate of EASO.140 Also the fact that asylum-seekers are dispersed over the 
country makes pre-relocation health checks more difficult and delays the relocation 
process.141 Compared to the Greek process, it was reported that Italian authorities do not 
provide complete lists containing important information for the process in the relocating 
Member State, e.g. identifying health issues or family ties.142   
 
The procedure on the ground is excessively complex and cumbersome, with multiple 
stages in different places, requiring the transfer of asylum seekers eligible for relocation from 
first reception centres in Southern Italy to a second destination in Central and Northern Italy, 
and then to Rome (the only pre-departure hub for relocation).143 This system of decentralised 
reception means that asylum seekers seem to fall through the cracks, although some 
stakeholders have defended this approach.144  
 
The hotspot approach has hampered relocation.145 The approach envisages that arrivals 
are quickly identified, and have their eligibility for relocation assessed by virtue of their 
nationality. However, as a key actor has pointed out,146 nationality determination is often 
complex and contested, and if mistakes are made in the hotspots, it is difficult to contest 
or correct them afterwards.  
 
2.4. Impact on Asylum Seekers in Greece and Italy 
 
These complex processes leave asylum seekers frustrated and anxious.   
 
In Greece, it was reported that asylum seekers frequently lack information about the 
relocation process.147 Greek stakeholders raised problems with lack of individual redress 
in the relocation system. Given that rejections are not subject to appeal, and appear often 
to be unexplained, there is an evident gap in effective judicial protection. The impact of lack 
of knowledge, long waiting times, and poor reception conditions is understandably increasing 
                                                 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), applicable to Italian hotspots, available at: 
http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/allegati/hotspots_sops_-
_english_version.pdf. 
140 On EASO’s role and responsibilities, see Daniela Vitiello, Face-to-Face Interview with Simona Spinelli, DU (Rome, 
8 February 2017). 
141 Survey Official H, 28 February 2017.  
142 Survey Official H, 28 February 2017. 
143 See Daniela Vitiello, Written Interview with Niccolò Ferrucci, BE (Rome, 14 February 2017); Daniela Vitiello, 
Written Interview with Valentina Brinis, ABD (Rome, 9 February 2017); Daniela Vitiello, Unofficial Summary of a 
meeting with NGO networks on relocation challenges in Italy (Rome, 9 February 2017), all explaining how the 
centralisation of departures may complicate the fulfilment of relocation.  
144 See Daniela Vitiello, Telephone Interview with Officials A and B, UNHCR (Rome, 16 February 2017); Daniela 
Vitiello, Telephone Interview with Flavia Calò, MEDU (Rome, 16 February 2017). Contra, see Daniela Vitiello, Face-
to-Face Interview with Simona Spinelli, DU (Rome, 8 February 2017), defending a reception system based on the 
model of ‘spread reception’ (so-called ‘accoglienza diffusa’). On this model, see also Daniela Vitiello, Telephone 
Interview with Christopher Hein and Elisa Maimone, CIR (Rome, 15 February 2017). 
145 Daniela Vitiello, Face-to-Face Interview with Simona Spinelli, DU (Rome, 8 February 2017): “There is an 
unbridgeable gap between the Italian concept of reception and the EU-led hotspot/relocation approach”; Daniela 
Vitiello, Telephone Interview with Flavia Calò, MEDU (Rome, 16 February 2017): “Relocation has become a synonym 
for fingerprinting and long waits. This makes people live in an unnecessarily inhumane limbo”; Daniela Vitiello, 
Telephone Interview with Christopher Hein and Elisa Maimone, CIR (Rome, 15 February 2017): “At the EU level, 
decisions of immigration and asylum cannot be taken only because there are no feasible alternatives – politically 
speaking. Political feasibility should be squared with EU legality and respect for the rule of law”. 
146 Daniela Vitiello, Face-to-Face Interview with Simona Spinelli, DU (Rome, 8 February 2017). 
147 Christina Velentza, Telephone Interview Refugee Center Coordinator (Athens, 10 February 2017); Christina 
Velentza, Written Interview Fotini Rantsiou Independent humanitarian advisor (Athens, 17 February 2017). 
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anxiety and frustration amongst those who seek to be relocated. Similarly in Italy, it was 
reported that eligible asylum seekers often lack information about the opportunity to 
apply for relocation or, when correctly informed, face administrative barriers during the 
relocation process, especially when transferred from one reception centre to another.148 
Efforts made by competent IOs and NGOs to support the identification of eligible asylum 
seekers and prioritise/follow up vulnerable cases are undermined by the regional reallocation 
of asylum seekers eligible for relocation. Asylum seekers’ frustration and anxiety leads to 
increased unauthorised abandonment of reception centres 149  and subsequent punitive 
exclusion from reception services in Italy. 150  In turn, this increases risks of onward 
movement151 and, for unaccompanied minors, of becoming victims of trafficking.152 
 
Concerning the experience of asylum seekers post-relocation, NGOs reported that there 
were misunderstandings as to the status of relocated asylum seekers. Some believed 
that they had already been granted asylum,153 and that once relocated, they would be 
welcomed as refugees and granted immediate access to the labour market. As they were not 
given access to the labour market and housing immediately, this led to understandable 
frustration.154  
 
It was also reported that asylum seekers did not receive a copy of their file with their initial 
interview when they are relocated to another Member State. This has reportedly led to 
problems for family reunification in The Netherlands, where the initial interview is used to 
check whether an applicant has mentioned the name of their family members. Long delays 
in transmitting these files later on have, at least in one case, led to family reunification being 
denied, because relevant proof did not arrive within the designated time frame. Providing 
asylum seekers with a copy of their file when they are relocated could help in this regard.155 
 
2.5. Normative Challenges 
 
Stakeholders in both Italy and Greece identified various shortcomings in the design of the 
relocation process. Firstly, the nationality criterion in the Relocation Decisions was 
characterised as distorted, discriminatory and ineffective, in particular for Italy, in light of 
migratory patterns. In practice too, issues were raised about swift nationality determinations, 
without a right of appeal. As these determine access to relocation, and there is currently no 
means to secure individual redress or correct wrongful decisions, this was seen as particularly 
unfair. The asymmetry between the context of Italy and Greece was noted. In particular, it 
                                                 
148 On the information challenge and the difficulties to ‘filter’ asylum seekers eligible for relocation at the points of 
disembarkation see Daniela Vitiello, Face-to-Face Interview with Simona Spinelli, DU (Rome, 8 February 2017).  
149 Daniela Vitiello, Face-to-Face Interview with Simona Spinelli, DU (Rome, 8 February 2017); Daniela Vitiello, 
Summary of a group interview with asylum seekers eligible for relocation (Rome, 18 February 2017), according to 
which many eligible asylum seekers move to Rome in the attempt to fast-track their relocation application.  
150 Daniela Vitiello, Written Interview with Caterina Bove, ASGI (Rome, 21 February 2017); Daniela Vitiello, Written 
Interview with Niccolò Ferrucci, BE (Rome, 14 February 2017); Daniela Vitiello, Written Interview with Official C, 
MSF (Rome, 21 February 2017); Daniela Vitiello, Written Interview with Valentina Brinis, ABD (Rome, 9 February 
2017).  
151 Daniela Vitiello, Telephone Interview with Officials A and B, UNHCR (Rome, 16 February 2017); Daniela Vitiello, 
Written Interview with Official C, MSF (Rome, 21 February 2017); Daniela Vitiello, Unofficial Summary of a meeting 
with NGO networks on relocation challenges in Italy (Rome, 9 February 2017).  
152 Daniela Vitiello, Telephone Interview with Flavia Calò, MEDU (Rome, 16 February 2017); Daniela Vitiello, Written 
Interview with Official C, MSF (Rome, 21 February 2017). 
153 E-Mail, NGO B, 16 February 2017. Natascha Zaun, Telephone Interview with NGO C, (Oxford, 20 February 2017). 
Survey NGO D, 20 February 2017. 
154 Survey NGO D, 20 February 2017. 
155 Natascha Zaun, Telephone Interview NGO C, (Oxford, 20 February 2017). 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
42 
was noted that Dublin transfers back to Greece are still prohibited, while Italy still takes back 
many asylum seekers under the Dublin system.   
 
Overall, the lack of involvement of asylum seekers in the decision-making process concerning 
their relocation was criticised. It was noted that it contributed to disaffection and secondary 
movements. As Chapter 1 makes clear, this study supports the use of preference matching 
to take the voice and agency of asylum seekers into account, and to make relocation more 
efficient. To be fair and effective, this means asylum seekers must have access to reliable 
sources of information, in order to determine their preferences as to states of relocation. At 
present, it appears that while many reasons why some destinations are considered more 
attractive than others, insufficient and misleading information could also a problem in this 
regard.156 As Chapter 4 explores, EASO is developing preference matching tools, and an app 
to provide information on relocation options. It was reported that at present it did not contain 
reliable information.157  
 
2.6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The most serious problem with relocation is that receiving Member States do not pledge any 
or enough places. In some cases, this is because Member States have overtly challenged the 
authority of the EU to relocate asylum seekers. In this content, while enforcement action 
to encourage compliance with EU law is available, it may not necessarily be effective. For 
those Member States that have overtly objected to relocation, that rejection has been part 
of a wider rejection of the EU rule of law, and a challenge to European values. In this context, 
relocation has become highly politicised. As yet, the European Commission is not keen to 
launch infringement proceedings.158 Some of the resistance to relocation reflects broader 
political challenges facing the European Union – in securing the rule of law at the 
supranational and national levels, and sustaining and fostering liberal democracy within the 
EU and its Member States. The modest project that is embodied in the EU relocation decisions 
had become a lighting-rod for much broader political concerns. It has been politicised and 
distorted in some Member States. Responding to this political challenge is important for the 
European Parliament and all EU institutions, and its scope goes well beyond the scope of the 
question of relocation itself. 
 
The other forms of non-compliance are less overt, and possibly less deliberate. For instance, 
when States claim not to have adequate reception spaces, a potential response to it is to 
create robust systems for external monitoring of the workings of reception and 
processing systems, and help states develop more efficient chain management of the 
asylum process, to avoid blockages in reception centres. At present, EASO has not developed 
tools to check real reception capacity, contest national assessments, or impose the 
acceptance of requests. The relocation scheme relies on the good will of Member States and 
the information they each provide, which eventually becomes the biggest source of hidden 
discretion in the system. EASO has a mandate to support Member States to develop their 
asylum processing and reception capacity, so developing tools for better management of 
reception is its role. Moreover, such supportive approaches could also lead to greater 
transparency about reception capacity. EU funding should be targeted to ensure that national 
reception systems are working efficiently, and that spaces are made available to cater for all 
asylum seekers, including unaccompanied minors. Most stakeholders envisaged that a 
                                                 
156 Survey NGO E, 20 February 2017, Natascha Zaun, Skype Interview with NGO A, (Oxford, 13 February 2017). 
Survey Official F, 3 March 2017.  
157 Natascha Zaun, Skype Interview NGO A, (Oxford, 13 February 2017). 
158 Cf. Read-out of the College meeting of 8 February 2017 by Frans Timmermans, First Vice-President of the EC in 
charge of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/audio/audioDetails.cfm?ref=I132953&sitelang=en. 
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better package of penalties and incentives should be developed to encourage greater 
relocation pledges. 
 
The administrative and reception challenges in both Italy and Greece demand better 
coordination of all relevant agencies; greater personnel on the ground with the appropriate 
communication skills; and swifter response to request for relocation. On national security 
screening, EASO should develop clear guidelines on this matter, but substantively and 
institutionally. EUROPOL’s role should be clarified, in particular in ensuring proper 
communication across pertinent authorities when there are genuine national security 
concerns.     
 
Many of the practical problems with the workings of relocation would be alleviated if Member 
States were pledging places simultaneously, which would enable effective preference 
matching. The voice and agency of asylum seekers must be taken into account if the 
relocation system is to respect and protect their human rights, and work effectively. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF THE HOTSPOT APPROACH IN 
RELOCATION  
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 
• The Hotspots approach is operationally linked to the relocation scheme as its 
‘enabler’. When originally designed, its key function was to support the identification 
of candidates for relocation. Yet, the practical focus has rather shifted to migration 
control, in a manner that has given rise to serious fundamental rights violations.  
• In Greece, the function of hotspots has transformed after the adoption of the EU-
Turkey Statement into closed centres of arbitrary pre-removal detention. 
• Overall, hotspots have not helped in alleviating pressure on the Italian and Greek 
systems. On the contrary, they increase burdens, due to structural shortcomings and 
continuing applications, exacerbating the flaws of the Dublin system. 
• While the contribution of the hotspot approach to relocation has been minimal, 
serious structural deficiencies in its design and implementation have emerged, 
including an overall dereliction of protection standards in both countries. 
• Inter alia, the hotspot approach is based on existing reception facilities. It does 
not directly provide additional reception capacity, which each hosting country must 
develop and enhance on its own, with assistance from EU funds and EU actors. 
• This contributes to exacerbating the persistent shortage of resources, 
aggravated by continuing arrivals and under-engagement from fellow Member States 
in relocation, deriving into delays, long waiting times, and despair among applicants. 
• If the emphasis continues to be on control and containment of flows, hotspots 
will replicate the deficiencies of Dublin and, just like Dublin, will not possibly 
succeed in rationalising responsibility allocation and a functioning protection system 
for the EU. A change of focus towards real engagement with Italy, Greece, and the 
refugees’ plight is necessary. 
 
 
3.1. Overarching rationale of the hotspots-relocation tandem 
 
Originally, the ‘hotspot approach’ emerged in the EU Agenda on Migration to deal with the 
situation in the Mediterranean,159 as an inter-agency joint venture to be deployed in Member 
States facing disproportionate pressures in terms of migration and border control. Ostensibly 
based on Articles 78(3) and 80 TFEU, the concept rapidly gained support in the Council.160 
Yet, the term ‘hotspot’ is of longer standing. It apparently has its origins in Frontex’s jargon 
to denote a section of the EU external border at risk of receiving high numbers of irregular 
arrivals.161 This prompts a policy and operational response, namely placing centres of first 
identification and registration close to those points, which are also called ‘hotspots’. So, while 
the ‘hotspots’ are physical locations, the ‘hotspot approach’ is the policy strategy to be applied 
at such locations. However, there is no clear legal framework clarifying its content or workings 
in practice. 
 
The approach focuses on EU agencies assisting host Member States to ‘swiftly identify, 
register and fingerprint incoming migrants’.162 The basic objective is to foster coordination 
and complementarity of efforts through an efficient division of labour, whereby EASO is to 
                                                 
159 EU Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240, 13 May 2015. 
160 EC Conclusions, 25-26 June 2015, EUCO 22/15, 26 June 2015, at 4. See also Measures to handle the refugee 
and migration crisis, Council doc. 13880/15, 9 November 2015. 
161 Violeta Moreno-Lax, Interview with EU Official A (Brussels, 9 February 2017). 
162 Agenda on Migration, p. 6. 
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ensure that asylum seekers are ‘immediately channelled into an asylum procedure where 
[Asylum Support Teams] help process [applications] as soon as possible’, while Frontex helps 
Member States with the return of irregular migrants that do not qualify for international 
protection, and Europol and Eurojust assist with investigations to dismantle smuggling 
rings.163 On the other hand, no specific role is assigned to the Fundamental Rights Agency 
(FRA). 
 
Since the opening of the first hotspots in Italy and Greece, the approach has been linked 
in operational terms to the implementation of the relocation programme.164 The 
‘hotspot approach’ has in fact been defined as the key ‘enabler’ of the relocation scheme.165 
It provides a platform for joint and targeted action, via an EU Regional Task Force (EURTF) 
(sited in their respective headquarters in Catania (Italy) and Piraeus (Greece)) responsible 
for overall coordination, coupled with a series of expert teams from contributing Agencies 
and Member States. 166  As Chapter 4 shows, the teams assume a variety of different 
functions; from the registration, fingerprinting, screening and referral of arrivals, to the 
implementation of relevant procedures (Dublin/relocation/asylum/return), the gathering of 
information on secondary movements and smuggling routes, and the coordination of removal 
and readmission arrangements to facilitate the expulsion of ‘persons who can be returned 
immediately’.167  
 
One key function, therefore, is to identify candidates for relocation and help with 
related processing and transfer to relocation countries. EASO activities in this realm also 
include assistance in the process of ‘matching’ potential beneficiaries with the most 
appropriate Member State.168 Indeed, potential beneficiaries are not allowed to choose their 
country of relocation and may oppose relocation decisions only in case of violations of their 
fundamental rights – through appeals, which, in principle, have no automatic suspensive 
effect.169 Otherwise, it is for the Member States to gauge their integration potential on the 
basis of ‘the specific qualifications and [other] characteristics of the applicants concerned’, 
including language, family, cultural or social ties.170  
3.2. Practical role of the hotspot approach in relocation from Italy 
 
In Italy, there are both fixed hotspots in Taranto, Trapani, Pozzalo, and Lampedusa, and 
several mobile units applying the hotspot approach in landing sites outside those locations 
– where up to 70% of arrivals disembark.171 The focus is mostly on border control and 
                                                 
163 Ibid. 
164 Managing the Refugee Crisis: Immediate operational, budgetary and legal measures under the European Agenda 
on Migration, COM(2015) 490 final/2, 29 September 2015, Annex 2. 
165 Violeta Moreno-Lax, Interview with EU Official A (Brussels, 9 February 2017). 
166  The Hotspot Approach to Managing Exceptional Migratory Flows, 8 September 2015, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/2_hotspots_en.pdf. 
167  Explanatory Note on the Hotspot Approach (July 2015), p. 4-5, available at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jul/eu-com-hotsposts.pdf. See also Relocation Decision 2015/1601, Art 7; 
and Relocation Decision 2015/1523, Art 7. 
168 EASO, Hotspot-Relocation (undated), available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/operational-support/hotspot-
relocation.  
169 Relocation Decision 2015/1601, Recital 25 and Art 3; and Relocation Decision 2015/1523, Recital 20 and Art 3.  
170 Relocation Decision 2015/1601, Recitals 34-35; and Relocation Decision 2015/1523, Recitals 28 and 30. 
171 Ninth report on relocation and resettlement, COM(2017) 74, 8 February 2017, p. 9.  
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‘the conduct of policing activities’,172 as manifested by an overwhelming presence of Frontex. 
It appears that, in practice, the multi-agency/multi-purpose rationale of hotspots is thereby 
being lost.173  
 
Activities are governed by Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs),174 adopted by Italy on the 
basis of a Roadmap.175 However, the SOPs are not legally binding and no legislation has 
been adopted to govern the hotspots specifically. In line with the key focus on border and 
migration control, the SOPs emphasise the need for fingerprinting as ‘the only reliable way’ 
of identification. 176  To overcome any resistance – following the Commission’s 
encouragement177 – the use of force, including on vulnerable individuals,178 is authorised – 
disregarding constitutional standards and criticism, not least, from the Italian police officers’ 
Union.179 In practice, there are credible reports that the coercive means include beatings, 
deprivation of basic services, food/water, and, in particular, arbitrary detention.180 The SOPs 
underline that ‘person[s] can leave the Hotspot only after having been photo fingerprinted’.181 
This comes to confirm the risks foreshadowed in previous studies for the European 
Parliament.182  
 
The focus on border and migration control has also meant that return procedures have 
been predominant. Orders to leave the territory and instances of forced removal without 
proper hearing or access to the asylum procedure have been identified, as have also 
practices of profiling on grounds of nationality, treating arrivals from non-relocation countries 
directly as ‘non-refugees’,183 selectively (mis-)informing them about their options and swiftly 
expelling them. Indeed, it appears that potential asylum seekers are not informed that it is 
at the pre-registration stage, via the compilation of the foglio notizie, that the intention to 
apply for asylum should be noted. And, although statements at this point can, in theory, be 
later changed, in practice, people are referred to the ‘right’ procedure on the basis of 
information disclosed in this phase.184 As a result, pre-registration works as a super-
summary/hyper-accelerated form of processing, impeding access to international 
                                                 
172  Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) applicable to Italian Hotspots (undated), p. 4, available at: 
http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/allegati/hotspots_sops_-
_english_version.pdf.  
173 Concurrently: Neville, Sy and Rigon, On the frontline: The hotspot approach to managing migration, Study PE 
556.942 (European Parliament, 2016), p. 40.  
174  Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) applicable to Italian Hotspots (undated), available at: 
http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/allegati/hotspots_sops_-
_english_version.pdf.  
175  Ministry of Interior, Roadmap Italiana, 28 September 2015, available at: 
http://www.meltingpot.org/IMG/pdf/roadmap-2015.pdf.  
176 Italian SOPs, p. 12. 
177 Italy – State of Play Report, COM(2016) 85, 10 February 2016, Annex 3. 
178 Italian SOPs, p. 15. 
179 UGL Polizia di Stato, ‘Fotosegnalamento forzoso, la risposta del Dipartimento’, 11 January 2016, available at: 
http://www.uglpoliziadistato.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6394:fotosegnalamento-forzoso-
la-risposta-del-dipartimento&catid=1:ultime&Itemid=50. 
180 ECRE et al., The Implementation of the Hotspots in Italy and Greece: A Study, October 2016, p. 16 and 23, 
available at: www.refworld.org/docid/584ad1734.html.  
181 Italian SOPs, p. 8 (emphasis added). See also p. 16 for cases of damage to fingerprints. 
182 Guild et al., New Approaches, Alternative Avenues and Means of Access to Asylum Procedures for Persons Seeking 
International, Study PE 509.989 (European Parliament, 2014); and Guild et al., Enhancing the Common European 
Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin, Study PE 519.234 (European Parliament, 2015). 
183 Concurrently: Neville, Sy and Rigon, On the frontline: The hotspot approach to managing migration, Study PE 
556.942 (European Parliament, 2016), p. 40.  
184 Italian SOPs, p. 7. Cf. p. 8, mentioning that ‘[f]or those who have not expressed the intention to apply for 
international protection…filling the…foglio notizie’ the return process should be started for removal to ‘be executed 
immediately’. 
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protection procedures, with no legal assistance and no appeal options (in fact no copy of the 
foglio notizie is handed to the applicant).185 Most worryingly, this triage is performed by police 
officers – not trained and not competent to make protection-related judgments – tasked to 
take instant decisions and refer people to either the asylum, the relocation, or the return 
process.186 It is, in fact, ‘based on the results of the screening’ that people ‘will receive a 
rejection order’.187 These practices appear tantamount to collective expulsion, in breach of 
Article 4 of Protocol 4 ECHR, and risk refoulement of those with international protection 
needs.188 
 
For the very few qualifying (due to the nationality criterion implicit in the 75% EU-wide 
recognition rate required for relocation), referrals for relocation are channelled (only) 
through the hotspots. Gaps in capacity to register and process lead to long delays and 
long stays in temporary accommodation, often in sub-standard conditions. These 
conditions affect particularly the most vulnerable, especially unaccompanied minors (UAMs). 
Italy has yet to develop sufficient accommodation capacity for UAMs, and their relocation 
prospects in practice are slim, as Chapter 2 had explained.189 Stays are generally in closed 
reception centres, again, in circumstances amounting to systematic/indiscriminate 
detention, with no effective judicial oversight or possibility to contest their deprivation of 
liberty – contrary to international human rights, EU, and constitutional guarantees.190  
 
During that period, EASO assists Italian authorities in carrying out the relocation procedure 
via a ‘matching activity’. This consists in ‘examining the applicants’ profile taking into account 
all relevant elements such as educational titles, professional qualifications and knowledge of 
foreign languages, previous jobs and family relations, etc. with indications for relocation by 
Member States, preparing and sending the relocation request, always taking into 
consideration prioritization of vulnerable applicants’.191 Usually, relocation candidates are 
asked to indicate 8 preferred Member States that EASO takes into account as far as 
possible.192 Security and exclusion screening takes place then by the Italian authorities, in 
cooperation with Member States’ liaison officers through EASO’s intermediation, and, if 
successful, ‘[f]ollowing approval by the Member State of relocation, a relocation decision [is] 
prepared with the support of the EASO experts assigned to the Dublin Unit’,193 which is then 
handed to the applicant. But, as relocation decisions cannot be generally challenged, there 
have been instances of secondary movement, in particular where candidates were allocated 
to a state of relocation not in line with their preferences. Technical difficulties and additional 
delays have also been an obstacle to creating trust in the system.194 
 
There are several problems that can arise throughout this process. Relocation, as pointed out 
in Chapter 2, is dysfunctional due to limited Member State engagement: under-pledging 
relocation places, unresponsive to EASO repeated calls for additional experts, and distrusting 
                                                 
185 ECRE et al., The Implementation of the Hotspots in Italy and Greece: A Study, October 2016, p. 14-15, 21 and 
30-31, available at: www.refworld.org/docid/584ad1734.html.  
186 Ministry of Interior, Circular 41807, 29 December 2015. 
187 Italian SOPs, p. 19. 
188 Cf. ECtHR, I.M. v France, Appl. 9152/09, 2 February 2012; A.C. v Spain, Appl. No. 6528/11, 22 April 2014; 
Sharifi v Italy and Greece, Appl. 16643/09, 21 October 2014. 
189 Ninth report on relocation and resettlement, COM(2017) 74, 8 February 2017, p. 9-10.  
190 ECRE et al., The Implementation of the Hotspots in Italy and Greece: A Study, October 2016, p. 14-15, 21 and 
28, available at: www.refworld.org/docid/584ad1734.html.   
191  EASO Operating Plan to Italy, December 2016, p. 11, available at: 
https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/20161214%20EASO%20OP%20Italy.pdf.  
192 Violeta Moreno-Lax, Interview with EU Official A (Brussels, 9 February 2017).  
193 EASO Operating Plan to Italy, December 2016, p. 11.  
194 Violeta Moreno-Lax, Interview with EU Official A (Brussels, 9 February 2017).  
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of security-checking by the Italian authorities. Chapter 2 explores the reasons for the poor 
compliance with the Relocation Decisions. 
 
3.3. Practical role of the hotspot approach in relocation from Greece 
 
The role of the five operative hotspots in the relocation scheme for Greece (located in 
Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros, and Kos) has to be de-coupled into two different phases: 
prior to 20 March 2016 and after, coinciding with the conclusion of the EU-Turkey Statement 
for the curtailment of migratory flows through the Aegean.195 
 
3.3.1. Before the EU-Turkey Statement 
Before the EU-Turkey Statement, hotspots were sites of reception for relocation and 
channelling to the asylum (or return) procedure of sea arrivals. Because most of those 
arriving were Syrian nationals, the primary focus was on managing their relocation out of 
Greece, thereby alleviating pressure from the Greek system. However, out of the 
approximately 1 million arrivals in Greek shores in 2015, 196  barely 10% submitted an 
application for international protection. 197  Most of them progressed to their preferred 
destinations in Germany and elsewhere through the Balkan route until its closure in March 
2016.198  
3.3.2. After the EU-Turkey Statement 
After the conclusion of the EU-Turkey Statement, protection seekers on the islands were 
moved to the mainland so that the hotspots have mainly been converted into closed pre-
removal detention centres, where post-EU-Turkey-Statement arrivals are mandatorily 
confined,199 while awaiting expulsion to Turkey.200 The European Commission led the way, 
stating that ‘the current focus on registration and screening before swift transfer to the 
mainland [was to be] replaced by the objective of implementing returns to Turkey’.201 The 
change of emphasis was also marked by the amendment to the Decision of 22 September 
2015, allowing for the 54,000 places earmarked for relocation to be usable for resettlement 
from Turkey in implementation of the agreement. 202 The staffing policy and differential 
budget allocations also denote a prevalence of migration and border control functions, with 
Frontex being the main agent supporting Greek authorities.203 
 
                                                 
195  EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.  
196  UNHCR, ‘Over one million sea arrivals reach Europe in 2015’, 30 December 2015, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-2015.html.  
197  UNHCR, Operational Portal – Mediterranean Situation, available at: 
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83%20.   
198  ‘Balkan Route “closed” after cascade of border shutdowns’, EuroActiv, 9 March 2016, available at: 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/balkan-route-closed-after-cascade-of-border-shutdowns/. 
For analysis, see Danish Refugee Council, Closing Borders, Shifting Routes: Summary of Regional Migration Trends 
Middle East, Report (May, 2016), available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/world/closing-borders-shifting-routes-
summary-regional-migration-trends-middle-east-may-2016.  
199 Confinement can be within the hotspot centres or through limitation of movement to the islands on which they 
are placed. In all cases, refugees cannot leave, which according to the ECtHR amounts to deprivation of liberty akin 
to detention: Labita v Italy, Appl. 26772/95, 6 April 2000. 
200 ECRE et al., The Implementation of the Hotspots in Italy and Greece: A Study, October 2016, p. 48-49.  
201 Next operational steps in EU-Turkey cooperation in the field of migration, COM(2016) 166, 16 March 2016, p. 4. 
202 Decision (EU) 2016/1754 of 29 September 2016 amending Decision (EU) 2015/1601 establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, [2016] OJ L 268/82. 
203 European Commission Fact Sheet, ‘Implementing the EU-Turkey Agreement – Questions and Answers’, 20 April 
2016, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1494_en.htm.   
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The new landscape has been backed by domestic legislative amendments in April and 
June 2016. Law 4375/2016 adopted the fast-track asylum procedure at border sites, 
incorporating the ‘safe third country’ and ‘first country of asylum’ notions in flexible terms. 
The aim was to ensure that returns to Turkey would be permitted, in spite of legal and 
empirical doubts about whether it meets EU conditions to be either a ‘Safe Third Country’ or 
‘First Country of Asylum’.204 Many returns to Turkey were legally prevented, due to the lack 
of effective international protection there, and due to the evidence of serious human rights 
violations against refugees.205 The response, under pressure from EU institutions,206 was to 
alter the composition of the Greek Asylum Appeal Committees via Law 4357/2016. Both 
legal instruments allow for EASO’s intervention, conducting inadmissibility interviews, 
assessing merits, and recommending final decisions. Yet, the adoption of detailed SOPs 
is still pending.207  
 
The new arrangements foresee very short periods for submission (1 day for interview 
preparation), processing, and appeal (3 days since rejection) of international protection 
requests, which can hardly qualify as ‘reasonable time’ under Article 43 APD.208 The absence 
of automatic suspensive effect is also at odds with European standards, as is stereotypical 
decision-making and insufficient substantiation of rejection decisions.209 Removals of 
failed applicants are equally swift, facilitated by the bilateral readmission protocol of 2002 
(amended in 2016 to allow for ‘immediate’ expulsion)210 and, since 1 June 2016, replaced by 
the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement.211 A total of 1,187 persons have been returned 
in the course of 2016 under these arrangements. 212  Readmission is then organised 
between Greece and Turkey normally within 7-10 days. Returnees are grouped together and 
expelled by boat or plane. Turkish liaison officers deployed in Greece assist in the process, 
alongside Greek and EU Agencies personnel, with returns organised and coordinated by 
Frontex. There have been reports of collective expulsions and removals amounting to 
refoulement, with no consideration of individual circumstances.213 And very little official 
                                                 
204 Human Rights Watch, ‘Turkey: Border Guards Kill and Injure Asylum Seekers’, 10 May 2016, available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/10/turkey-border-guards-kill-and-injure-asylum-seekers; Amnesty 
International, ‘Turkey: Illegal mass returns of Syrian refugees expose fatal flaws in EU-Turkey deal’, 1 April 2016, 
at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/04/turkey-illegal-mass-returns-of-syrian-refugees-expose-
fatal-flaws-in-eu-turkey-deal/. 
205 This has led to 390 out of the 407 inadmissibility decisions being reversed. See Fourth report on the progress 
made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, COM(2016) 792, 8 December 2016, p. 6. The 
constitutionality of this approach is being tested at the Greek Council of State. See Decision No. 441/15.02.2017 
referring the matter to the Plenary of the Court. 
206 ‘Greece’s asylum committees are about to change under EU Council’s pressure’, New Europe, 10 June 2016, 
available at: https://www.neweurope.eu/article/greeces-asylum-committees-are-about-to-change-under-eu-
councils-pressure/; ‘Greece’s Asylum Appeals Committees denounce changes to facilitate mass deportations to 
Turkey’, Keep Talking Greek Blog (containing a post signed by several members of the Committees), 20 June 2016, 
available at: http://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2016/06/20/greeces-asylum-appeals-committees-denounce-
changes-to-facilitate-mass-deportations-to-turkey/.  
207 Fourth report on the progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, COM(2016) 792, 8 
December 2016, Annex I, p. 4. 
208 See also Case C-69/10 Diouf [2011] I-7151. 
209 Art. 47 CFR. Apparently, the majority of 1st instance decisions are being rejected by reference to the safe third 
country principle, in identical terms and with no proper reasoning. See ECRE et al., The Implementation of the 
Hotspots in Italy and Greece: A Study, October 2016, p. 38. 
210  ‘Greece and Turkey build on plan for return of refugees’, Ekathimerini, 23 March 2016, available at: 
http://www.ekathimerini.com/206786/article/ekathimerini/news/greece-and-turkey-build-on-plan-for-return-of-
refugees.  
211  European Commission Fact Sheet, Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement – Questions and Answers, 28 
September 2016, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3204_en.htm.  
212 Ibid. 
213 ECRE et al., The Implementation of the Hotspots in Italy and Greece: A Study, October 2016, p. 12-14.  
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information is publicly available on the situation of returnees – though they are such that, 
e.g., ‘ten [Syrians] decided to return voluntarily to Syria’.214  
 
The hotspot-relocation link has thus been broken in Greece. Since April 2016, 
international protection cases considered admissible (mostly on Dublin family criteria or 
vulnerability grounds) are pre-registered, provided with an asylum seeker card and an 
interview date in Athens through the (unreliable) Skype system operated by the Greek 
Asylum Service (GAS),215 and only then permitted to leave the islands. The time until the 
Athens appointment is normally a few weeks during which the applicant may or may not be 
accommodated in reception centres.  
 
Only those from eligible nationalities who arrived in Greece before the EU-Turkey 
Statement qualify for relocation. As pointed out in Chapter 2, this entails a distorted 
reading of the terms of the (binding) Relocation Decisions, which do not contain a time limit 
for relocation outside the two-year period of total duration of the scheme.  Irrespective of 
the political aims, the non-binding EU-Turkey ‘Statement’ cannot legally change  the scope 
of the binding Decisions. In any event, to enable identification, the GAS conducted a mass 
pre-registration exercise of 28,000 potential candidates in the summer of 2016. 216 
Thereafter, relocation is arranged only from the mainland, with applications filed in Athens, 
Thessaloniki, or Alexandroupoli. Interviews are performed by the GAS and/or EASO officials. 
A Relocation Unit has succeeded the Dublin Unit in undertaking security and matching tests 
(using the same methodology as in Italy), with participation from the liaison officers of 
Member States, who may conduct additional checks and provide pre-arrival information upon 
acceptance of the relocation case.217  
 
3.4. Conclusions and Recommendations: Overall contribution of the 
hotspot approach to relocation 
 
Hotspots have not helped in relieving the pressure on Italy and Greece. Instead, they 
increase burdens, leading to rising numbers of applicants, exacerbating Dublin 
shortcomings, and to the adoption of repressive measures, disregarding human rights 
and degrading protection standards. 218  They have mainly functioned as a ‘filtering’ 
mechanism, but with little to no procedural guarantees and vulnerabilities/special needs 
discounted or ill-identified.219 
                                                 
214 Fourth report on the progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, COM(2016) 792, 8 
December 2016, p. 5. 
215 Neville, Sy and Rigon, On the frontline: The hotspot approach to managing migration, Study PE 556.942 
(European Parliament, 2016), p. 20. Confirmed: Violeta Moreno-Lax, Telephone Interview with EASO Official C 
(London, 16 February 2017). Note that there is merely a one-hour window for relocation candidates to try book an 
appointment via Skype on Mondays, Tuesdays, or Wednesdays only, according to the information leaflet distributed 
by EASO in Greece, p. 2: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/BZ0416141ENC_proof2_5rev.pdf.  
216 Ninth report on relocation and resettlement, COM(2017) 74, 8 February 2017, p. 8; and EASO Special Operating 
Plan to Greece, EASO/DOP/OU/2016/1812, December 2016, p. 5. Cf. data provided by EU Official C sets this number 
to nearly 50,000. See Violeta Moreno-Lax, Telephone Interview with EU Official C (London, 16 February 2017). 
217 AIDA, Country Report Greece: Update, February 2017 (on file). 
218 Maiani, ‘Hotspots and Relocation Schemes: The right therapy for the Common European Asylum System?’ EU 
Migration Law Blog, 3 February 2016, available at: http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/hotspots-and-relocation-schemes-
the-right-therapy-for-the-common-european-asylum-system/. See also Webber, ‘Hotspots for asylum applications: 
Some things we urgently need to know’, EU Law Analysis, 29 September 2015, available at: 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.au/2015/09/hotspots-for-asylum-applications-some.html.  
219 ECRE et al., The Implementation of the Hotspots in Italy and Greece: A Study, October 2016, p. 7, available at: 
www.refworld.org/docid/584ad1734.html. See also Amnesty International, ‘Hotspot Italy: How flagship approach 
leads to violations of refugee and migrant rights’, October 2016, available at: 
https://www.amnesty.ch/it/news/2016/italia-espulsioni-illegali-e-maltrattamenti-di-profughi/hotspot-italy-
final.pdf; and Amnesty International, ‘Greece: Refugees detained in dire conditions amid rush to implement EU-
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Indeed, while the contribution of the hotspot approach to relocation has been minimal, very 
serious structural deficiencies in its design and implementation have emerged: The 
provision of information on relocation arrangements seems to be unsystematic and delivered 
only ‘where appropriate’. 220  Fingerprinting practices include recourse to ‘reasonable 
coercion’,221 and the prevention of secondary movements has led to systematic detention.222  
 
Serious shortages of material, equipment, and personnel are deepening the crisis, 
with only a fraction of the total number of officers requested for deployment by EU agencies 
seconded to the hotspots. In fact, one key drawback is that the hotspot approach ‘does 
not provide reception facilities to its host Member States but builds on their existence 
and functioning’,223 which has revealed wholly unrealistic. With continuing arrivals in Greece 
and Italy, it is obvious that reception capacities in both countries can’t but be overwhelmed, 
exposing the inadequacy of the premise underpinning hotspots.  
 
In these circumstances, hotspots have contributed to slow processing of relocation and 
related case-loads. In practice, long waiting periods, inhuman conditions, perceptions of 
discrimination and unfairness have contributed to despair among applicants. On the 
other hand, constant calls for speed from the Commission and the EU Coordinator on the 
implementation of certain provisions of the EU-Turkey Statement have had an impact on the 
quality of decision-making, particularly at first instance.224 The lack of a dedicated legal 
framework has boosted uncertainty, if not arbitrariness. The intervention of different actors 
at national, EU, and international level, as explained in Chapter 4, has confounded 
responsibilities, blurring roles/competences and rising issues of liability/accountability.225  
 
With the accent put on the control and containment of flows, hotspots replicate the 
flaws of Dublin and, just like Dublin, will not possibly succeed in fostering solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility. The need to recognise the rights and agency of forced 
migrants as to their decisions on where they wish to apply for asylum and incorporate their 
concerns and entitlements in the selection of the country of their relocation, if only for 
practical reasons, is fundamental to the functioning of the scheme. Until and unless a non-
coercive system of responsibility allocation is in place, irregular secondary flows and human 
rights violations will continue, as people will find ways to reunite with family and friends.226 
                                                 
Turkey deal’, 7 April 2016, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/04/greece-refugees-
detained-in-dire-conditions-amid-rush-to-implement-eu-turkey-deal/.  
220  Explanatory Note on the Hotspot Approach (July 2015), p. 4, available at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jul/eu-com-hotsposts.pdf. 
221 Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints, SWD(2015) 150 final, 
27 May 2015, para. 7; and Relocation Decision 2015/1601, Art 5(5); and Relocation Decision 2015/1523, Art 5(5). 
On the risks of forcible fingerprinting, see Fundamental rights implications of the obligation to provide fingerprints 
for Eurodac, FRA Focus 05/2015, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/fundamental-rights-
implications-obligation-provide-fingerprints-eurodac.  
222 Cf. Relocation Decision 2015/1601, Recitals 38-41; and Relocation Decision 2015/1523, Recitals 32-34. 
223  Explanatory Note on the Hotspot Approach (July 2015), p. 5, available at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jul/eu-com-hotsposts.pdf. 
224 Cf. Joint Action Plan of the EU Coordinator on the implementation of certain provisions of the EU-Turkey 
Statement, Annex I, Fourth Report on the Progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, 
COM(2016) 792, 8 December 2016; Ninth Report on relocation and resettlement, COM(2016) 74, 8 February 2017. 
225 Concurrently: Neville, Sy and Rigon, On the frontline: The hotspot approach to managing migration, Study PE 
556.942 (European Parliament, 2016). 
226 On the shortcomings of the Dublin system and advocating for a ‘Dublin without coercion’ alternative, see Guild 
et al., New Approaches, Alternative Avenues and Means of Access to Asylum Procedures for Persons Seeking 
International, Study PE 509.989 (European Parliament, 2014); and Guild et al, Enhancing the Common European 
Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin, Study PE 519.234 (European Parliament, 2015). 
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CHAPTER 4: THE ROLE OF EU AGENCIES AND 
INSTITUTIONS IN RELOCATION  
 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 
• Together with EASO, several other EU agencies, international bodies, and other 
loosely coordinated actors contribute to the implementation of the hotspot and 
relocation schemes with varying degrees of implication and importance, 
without an overarching, a priori definition of roles and responsibilities. 
• Frontex plays a key role, in some respects even more so than EASO, with the 
overwhelming emphasis of hotspot arrangements on control and removal. 
• Both agencies assume tasks and powers beyond the terms of their founding 
regulations, acting without a clear EU legal mandate.  
• Coordination structures are horizontal and non-hierarchical, thus apparently 
creating barriers to the translation of legal priorities into practical action. This 
generates real risks of fundamental rights violations and international 
protection guarantees. 
• The lack of monitoring mechanisms and channels of democratic and judicial 
oversight entails specific threats on the EU rights to asylum, the prohibition of 
refoulement, and effective remedy guarantees, as reflected in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
 
 
4.1. Hotspots and relocation as multi-actor ventures 
 
As pointed out in Chapter 3, the hotspot approach has been conceived of and designed as a 
multi-actor, multi-purpose project, with a series of EU agencies intervening to support 
national administrations of beneficiary Member States. The most important are Frontex and 
EASO, but there are also other bodies and organisations assuming a role.  
 
4.2. The role of EASO in hotspots and relocation 
 
The ‘grand lines’ of EASO’s tasks in Italy and Greece are similar, but there are important 
nuances, due to the specific role the Agency plays in each country and the legal baking 
sustaining it, that need be noted. 
 
4.2.1. The role of EASO in Italy’s hotspots and relocation scheme 
 
In Italy, EASO intervenes in hotspots on the basis of the SOPs, assisting at various points of 
the ‘operational sequence’ defined therein.227 The agency is tasked with the provision of 
information on relocation to new arrivals alongside UNHCR, ‘aimed at ensuring the relocation 
of applicants as quickly as possible’.228 They are also called on to assist with the identification 
and handling of UAMs in particular, to cater for their particular reception and procedural 
needs.229 Finally, EASO is also supposed to support the practical and effective administration 
                                                 
227 Italian SOPs, p. 7. 
228  Ibid., p. 5 and 7. See also EASO Information Leaflet for Italy (undated): 
https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/BZ0416141ENC_proof2_5rev.pdf. 
229 Italian SOPs, p. 17-18. 
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of the relocation scheme with regard to transfers to reception centres and the management 
of relocation candidates.230 In this regard, not only should EASO experts provide detailed 
know-how to facilitate decision-making, but they may also engage in ‘forms of joint 
evaluation’ – beyond the terms contemplated in the current version of the EASO 
Regulation.231 
 
On this basis, EASO itself has adopted an Operating Plan to Italy in December 2016.232 
Communication regarding its implementation is ensured through regular dialogue between 
the Italian plan coordinator and the EASO plan coordinator. The EASO office in Rome 
coordinates the work.233 According to the Plan, EASO assumes a series of activities to be 
conducted in the course of 2017. These include support with the provision of information not 
only to relocation candidates, but also to potential applicants for international protection 
generally for effective channelling into the adequate procedure 
(asylum/relocation/return);234 support with registration handling following the transfer to 
reception centres, recording applications, conducting ‘supplementary interviews’ for 
relocation purposes and with a view to identifying Dublin and exclusion cases;235 assistance 
with handling outgoing relocation and Dublin cases, through the matching procedure, sending 
and receiving relocation requests, preparing relocation decisions upon approval of the 
relocation country, processing relocation and Dublin files; 236  strengthening reception 
capacity, especially for UAMs, through counselling on age and status assessment, family 
tracing, guardian appointment;237 and building professional development through training 
and exchange activities with other Member States.238 
 
4.2.2. The role of EASO in Greece’s hotspots and relocation scheme 
 
Like in Italy, EASO in Greece is engaged in all stages of the hotspot-relocation/asylum/return 
continuum, starting with the provision of initial information through the distribution of a 
leaflet in six languages, specifying key details regarding the different procedures.239 It also 
records and registers relocation/asylum requests, carries out the matching test (as specified 
in Chapter 3), and may handle the processing of applications from beginning to end, 
undertaking all intermediary steps.240 If the application is successful, it may be involved in 
the provision of pre-departure information to relocation beneficiaries.241 The office provides 
also interpreters, counsellors, and cultural mediators to support the different processes.242 
                                                 
230 Ibid., p. 19 and 22. 
231 Ibid., p. 22. Note that EASO’s mandate is currently under review and it may be expanded to accommodate some 
of the tasks the Agency is presently undertaking in the hotspots and within the relocation scheme. See Proposal for 
a Regulation on the European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010, COM(2016) 
271, 4 May 2016.  
232  EASO, Operating Plan to Italy, 21 December 2016, available at: 
https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/20161214%20EASO%20OP%20Italy.pdf. 
233 Ibid., p. 6. 
234 Ibid., p. 8. 
235 Ibid., p. 9-10. 
236 Ibid., p.11. 
237 Ibid., p. 12-13. 
238 Ibid., p. 13. 
239 ECRE et al., p. 20. For a copy of the English version, see EASO Information Leaflet for Greece (undated): 
https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/BZ0116194ENN_0.pdf. 
240 ECRE et al., p. 34, 38, 44, 47-48.  
241 Ibid., p. 48.  
242 Violeta Moreno-Lax, Telephone Interview with EU Official C (Brussels, 9 February 2017). 
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A Special Operating Plan for 2017 has also been adopted for Greece, matching the Italian 
template.243 The first task attributed to EASO under the Plan is also related to information 
provision on relocation and international protection within the Greek system, so that 
applicants can be referred to the appropriate track.244 Advice on nationality, vulnerability 
assessment, and possible security or exclusion issues is also foreseen.245 Support with Dublin 
cases along the lines of the Italian Plan should also be provided, specially considering that 
the Greek Dublin Unit has rapidly expanded and most officers are ‘junior and 
inexperienced’. 246 Assistance with the detection of document fraud relating to ‘Syrians, 
Iraqis, Afghanis and Palestinians’ in particular is also contemplated.247 Practical support in 
the operation of reception centres is equally foreseen, including through ‘practical on-the-job 
support’ and ‘liaison, information and referral…to the relocation process’. 248  Support in 
training, the delivery of tailor-made ad-hoc workshops, the organisation of study visits to 
other Member States to strengthen bilateral contacts and exchange best practices, as well 
as assistance with the absorption of EU funds and other financial resources are all geared 
towards enhancing Greek capacity.249   
 
Indeed, after the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement, EASO efforts concentrate in 
supporting its implementation and increasing overall capacity of the Greek system. This shall 
be done, inter alia, through direct intervention in the admissibility processing of asylum 
requests.250 According to Article 60(4) of Law 4375/2016, the participation of EASO experts 
in all first instance procedures is allowed. As a result, the Plan provides for admissibility 
interviews to be conducted by EASO officers, charged with drafting opinions and 
recommending final decisions on individual cases251 – despite limitations in the current 
version of the EASO Regulation, according to which the Agency ‘should have no direct or 
indirect powers in relation to the taking of decisions by Member States' asylum authorities 
on individual applications for international protection’.252 They are, in fact, already conducting 
most of these functions independently, notwithstanding the exercise of administrative 
discretion they entail (which should be reserved to domestic officials, at least until a legal 
basis is available under EU law).253 In relation to those under the 1:1 scheme from Turkey, 
EASO, in cooperation with the Commission, the Member States, UNHCR and Turkey, is 
currently developing SOPs for application to resettlement procedures – which for the time 
being follow ad hoc arrangements. 254  And once (if ever) the Humanitarian Admission 
Programme is activated, EASO will also play a role therein – SOPs for this scheme are equally 
under development.255   
                                                 
243  EASO, Special Operating Plan to Greece, December 2016, available at: 
https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EASO%20Special%20Operating%20Plan%20to%20Greece%20201
7_%2014122016.pdf.  
244 Ibid., p. 5-6.  
245 Ibid., p. 6 and 15-16.  
246 Ibid., p. 6-7.  
247 Ibid., p. 7-8.  
248 Ibid., p. 10.  
249 Ibid., p. 9-15.  
250 Ibid., p. 8-9.  
251 Ibid., p. 9.  
252 Recital 14 and Art 2(6), Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 
2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office [2010] L 132/11. 
253 Concurrently: Tsourdi, ‘Hotspots and EU Agencies: Towards an integrated European administration’, EU Migration 
Law Blog, 26 January 2017, available at: http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/hotspots-and-eu/.  
254  European Commission Fact Sheet, Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement – Questions and Answers, 28 
September 2016, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3204_en.htm.  
255 Ibid. Fourth Report on the Progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, COM(2016) 792, 
p. 10. For a detailed critique of the Humanitarian Admission Programme, see Moreno-Lax, Europe in Crisis: 
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4.3. The role of FRONTEX in hotspots and relocation  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the role of Frontex in the hotspots is much more prominent than the 
one played by EASO (both in Italy and post-EU-Turkey-Statement Greece). Since the filtering 
for relocation (asylum or return) occurs at the hotspots at an early stage, Frontex’s 
intervention impacts decisively on relocation (asylum and return) outcomes.  
 
Generally, the Agency provides assistance with registration and nationality screening of new 
arrivals, possibly including fingerprinting and EURODAC recording. As already stated, it is 
after the screening interview that applicants are referred and channelled (on the basis of 
their nationality and asylum requests) to relocation/international protection/return 
processing. Frontex also undertakes debriefing interviews for intelligence gathering purposes 
on smuggling and trafficking networks. The return process is also supported by the Agency, 
through pre-return/return assistance in obtaining travel documents, the organisation of 
removal operations, and cooperation with authorities of third countries.256 All these functions 
have received legal backing in the new European Board and Coast Guard (EBCG) Regulation 
since October 2016, with new Article 18 on ‘Migration Management Support Teams’.257   
 
4.3.1. The role of Frontex in Italy’s hotspots and relocation scheme 
 
In Italy, Frontex assists with identification, recording, and fingerprinting of new arrivals.258 
The Agency can also support personal security checks and checks on personal effects.259 It 
has been assigned pre-identification and screening functions to determine nationality, 
through the compilation of the foglio notizie and/or via in-depth interviews in case of doubt.260 
For the detection of forged documents, Frontex may deploy high-level experts in this 
matter.261 Applicants should be informed of the purpose of these steps ‘orally…in a language 
that the person can understand’ and taking account of any vulnerabilities.262 Cross-checks of 
fingerprints and personal details in EURODAC and national databases can also be entrusted 
to the Agency. 263  To collect and examine details regarding smuggling routes, Frontex 
undertakes debriefing interviews as well, gathering evidence from boats and retrieving 
articles in possession of individual applicants (including ‘notes, maps, phone numbers, mobile 
phones, photographs, tickets, documents…food containers or paper used for wrapping’), to 
enable risk analysis.264 It shall also ‘report’ persons in need of protection – although no clear 
referral tools have been devised yet265 – and coordinate returns. 266 
                                                 
Facilitating Access to Protection, (Discarding) Offshore Processing and Mapping Alternatives for the Way Forward 
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256  ‘Situation at External Border’, Frontex Press Room, available at: 
http://frontex.europa.eu/pressroom/faq/situation-at-external-border/.  
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265 Observations by Frontex Fundamental Rights Officers, 2015 Report on the Implementation of the Maritime 
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4.3.2. The role of Frontex in Greece’s hotspots and relocation scheme 
 
The role of Frontex in Greece is similar to the one the Agency plays in Italy. From 
disembarkation to registration, Frontex may provide first aid and escort arrivals ashore. As 
in Italy, it will conduct nationality screening, asking questions on language, culture, 
geography, in the absence of reliable identity documents. Frontex interpreters and document 
fraud detectors will be present at that stage. A screening form, similar to the foglio notizie, 
will be compiled, with the nationality, age, language spoken, and an indication of whether 
the person intends to apply for asylum. Identification through fingerprinting is then carried 
out in the presence of Frontex fingerprinting experts. Debriefing takes place immediately 
afterwards. Several questions covering family links, need for protection, etc. relevant to the 
asylum process are asked already at this stage, with a decision to detain with a view to 
deportation by the Greek authorities following, mostly based on the Frontex’s assessment.267  
 
4.4. The role of other EU agencies  
 
Europol has an assigned role within the hotspots and is represented in the EU Regional Task 
Force. Its main responsibility is to enhance intelligence exchange on anti-smuggling/anti-
trafficking efforts, relying on Frontex debriefing data. Information is cross-checked within the 
Europol Computer System (EIS) and relevant databases, and the agency may furnish 
capacity-building activities for the identification of threats, strategic and operational analysis, 
technical and coordination activities. 268  Europol has devised a secured communication 
channel for national security determinations, so that Member States can ‘safely provide 
reasons for rejections of relocation rejects’, but it has never been used so far.269 Member 
States are zealous to conduct their own security screenings through their own domestic 
means and liaise with Italian/Greek authorities through their own liaison officers deployed in 
Rome and Athens, failing to engage in EU processes that they perceive out of their full control. 
This has prompted frictions and instances of insurmountable distrust, as the case of Ireland 
vis-à-vis Italy illustrates in recent times.270 Considering the sensitivity of the information 
concerned and the danger of it falling in the hands of potential 
persecutors/traffickers/smugglers, the centralisation of communications through duly 
encrypted, secured means should be seriously appraised.271   
 
Eurojust supports crime-prevention, hotspot-based work through its judicial cooperation 
role, coordinating action to dismantle and prosecute related criminal networks.272 EU-LISA 
also contributes through provision of expertise regarding registration of biometrics, the 
optimal use of IT for registration, and data quality issues.273 
 
On the other hand, the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) has no standing presence or 
predetermined function within the hotspots or the relocation scheme. It is foreseen that its 
expertise ‘can be used’, but there has been no streamlining so far of its input.274 
                                                 
267 ECRE et al., p. 40-41. 
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4.5. The role of the European Commission and related EU bodies  
 
The Commission has overall responsibility for the hotspot approach and the relocation 
scheme. It convenes and chairs regular Liaison Officers’ meetings in Greece and Italy. The 
most recent were held on 14 December 2016 and 31 January 2017. These meetings aim to 
improve information exchange during the relocation process, including cultural orientation 
sessions at the pre-departure phase to better manage expectations and minimise onward 
movement.275 
 
The practical (horizontal) coordination of the hotspot approach is, in turn, ensured by an EU 
Regional Task Force (EURTF), headquartered in the benefiting Member State, bringing 
together officers from the key participating EU Agencies (i.e. Frontex, Europol, EASO and 
Eurojust) and either Italy or Greece. The EURTF is also charged with external liaising with 
relevant international and non-governmental organisations.276  
 
Although not formally contemplated in EU documents regarding relocation/resettlement or 
the hotspot approach, the Italian SOPs foresee also the intervention of EUNAVFOR Med in 
relation to personal security checks and checks of personal effects.277 This, however, exceeds 
the scope and powers of the mission, as defined in its founding documents.278 
 
Finally, with regard to the EU-Turkey Statement, an EU Special Coordinator has been 
nominated by the President of the European Commission (Director General Maarten Verwey) 
to ensure the effective implementation of the different commitments. He is assisted by a 
Coordination Team, charged with the strategic direction and relations with the main 
stakeholders. A Steering Committee, chaired by the Commission, with representatives of 
Greece, EASO, Frontex, Europol, the EC Presidency, France, Germany, and the UK, oversees 
the process – why France, Germany, and the UK are specifically represented, unlike other EU 
Member States besides Greece (as beneficiary of the scheme) is nowhere made explicit.279 
The EU Coordinator, together with Greece, has put together a Joint Action Plan for the 
implementation of certain key provisions of the Statement with the objective of speeding up 
its application – thus insisting on shortening processing times, ‘limiting appeal steps’, 
increasing safety, security and ‘detention capacities’, accelerating relocation and returns, and 
sealing the Greek northern borders to avoid secondary movements.280 If fully implemented, 
Greece may become a pre-removal / return processing hub for the entire EU. 
 
For those to be resettled from Turkey, the EU Resettlement Team coordinates assistance 
to Member State operations and intermediates with IOM, UNHCR, and the Turkish General 
Directorate for Migration Management.281   
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4.6. The role of international organisations and NGOs 
 
UNHCR is crucially engaged in the relocation and resettlement schemes.282 Together with 
EASO, it typically assists in the early identification of persons in need of international 
protection, individuals with particular vulnerabilities (especially UAMs), and potential 
relocation beneficiaries. 283  It is also involved in information activities in landing sites, 
distributing leaflets and orally.284 And it may conduct training activities for police officers and 
NGOs.285 It also plays an essential part assisting Turkish and EU authorities in referring cases 
for resettlement and supporting the development of a continuous registration mechanism of 
Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey, as potential candidates for resettlement.286 
 
The same applies to IOM, which is also involved in the resettlement scheme, ensuring the 
logistics of operations.287 Within the hotspot-relocation tandem, it also assists in the provision 
of information (specially regarding assisted voluntary return) and the identification of 
vulnerable applicants, mainly potential victims of human trafficking.288 In addition, it ensures 
transportation and pre-departure cultural orientation.289 
 
Although NATO plays no direct/official role in either the hotspots or the relocation 
programme, it has signed SOPs with Frontex in July 2016 for cooperation in the Aegean. This 
entails a ‘common situational picture, early warning, surveillance activities and sharing of 
operational information with the Greek and Turkish Coast Guards…to continuously increase 
the already high detection rate and to speed up information exchange on migrant 
smuggling’. 290 It can also be expected that this relation may feed the improvement of 
containment figures – with ‘preventions of departure’ from Turkey currently standing at 
around 400-500 weekly apprehensions, regardless of refoulement and right-to-leave 
implications.291 
 
4.7. Conclusions and Recommendations: The need for coordination 
and structured cooperation   
 
The fact that a host of EU Agencies, international organisations, and other stakeholders 
have been able to come and work together with the Member States and the European 
Commission in the quest for a solution to the relocation problem is a positive aspect of the 
hotspot approach. This holds the potential of fostering a common understanding and 
prompting a common solution to the problems facing Italy and Greece as ‘European 
problems’ mandating a (truly) ‘European response’.  
 
On the other hand, the proliferation of actors in the hotspots and/or within the relocation 
process has by and large been ad hoc, creating uncertainty, especially in Greece, including 
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in relation to simple, key tasks, such as the provision of initial (reliable) information on 
processes and outcomes.292 
 
Uncertainty relates also to the different roles and responsibilities of each actor. 
Without a dedicated legal framework backing the relocation / hotspot scheme, each 
agency is relying on its own founding Regulation, without that, however, compensating the 
absence of an overarching scheme. Frictions, contradictions, and legal vacuums have 
thus emerged, with, for instance, no coverage being provided (in EU law) for EASO’s role in 
asylum processing in Greece, and with Frontex overstepping its mandate when enrolling data 
in EURODAC or compiling pre-registration forms via interviews with candidates.  
 
A clearer apportioning of tasks and powers would also be necessary to restore the 
equilibrium between Agencies and the non-hierarchical spirit of the hotspot 
approach. At present, there are considerable disparities between on-the-ground 
deployments and financial resources per Agency, hailing Frontex as ‘primus inter pares’.293 
The preponderant focus of hotspots has thus been on migration management and swift 
returns, overshadowing the relocation scheme. It is paradoxical that through the pre-
eminence of Frontex and the emphasis on control and removal the means-ends 
relationship between the hotspot approach and the relocation scheme has been 
inverted. The latter has virtually disappeared from the Greek scene after the EU-Turkey 
Statement and the option given to Member States to instead resettle directly from Turkey. 
 
The lack of specific monitoring mechanisms by independent actors, the limited input 
of FRA and specialised NGOs, makes the whole scheme suspect and non-transparent, 
as does the lack of channels for individual challenge and judicial oversight. The 
absence of remedies against crucial decisions devoid (in theory) of legal effect – including 
regarding nationality allocation, pre-registration, referral, and admissibility to international 
protection – disregards the essential impact they have on the (legal) position of applicants, 
depriving them of their rights to good administration and effective judicial protection (Articles 
41 and 47 CFR). By providing a binary choice between protection or return, the hotspot 
approach over-simplifies the complexities involved in status determination, 
disregarding basic guarantees, and with the potential to hamper access to asylum (Article 18 
CFR) and ultimately lead to refoulement (Articles 4 and 19 CFR).  
 
Therefore, the ‘Europeanisation’ of the hotspot-relocation scheme is in order – following 
the trend witnessed in the governance of external borders through the adoption of the EBCG 
Regulation – so as to re-balance representation on the ground and re-establish the 
equilibrium of priorities between protection and control. The rationalisation of links and 
functions of and between the different actors will bring clarity, transparency, and rule of law-
compatibility to the system. It will serve to avoid duplication of efforts, apportion resources 
and responsibilities effectively, and foster trust in the scheme.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE DUBLIN 
REGULATION FOR RELOCATION 
KEY FINDINGS 
 
• The coexistence of the relocation scheme with Dublin transfers is internally 
inconsistent and structurally flawed. It leads to perverse outcomes, with incoming 
Dublin transfers outnumbering relocation figures, wasting resources and compounding 
strain on beneficiary Member States. 
• The resumption of Dublin transfers to Greece is premature and, given current 
reception conditions in Greece, incompatible with ECHR and EU Charter human 
rights standards. 
• The consolidation of the relocation scheme as part of the Dublin IV reform is to 
be welcomed, as it will provide continuity to the system on a permanent basis. 
• On the other hand, the fundamental shortcomings of the Dublin system remain 
unaddressed in the Commission proposal, which will exacerbate the flaws that 
originally triggered the adoption of the relocation scheme. Maintaining the key 
features of Dublin will only perpetuate deficiencies and consolidate the 
unfairness inbuilt into the system, contradicting the spirit of Article 80 TFEU. 
• The new corrective allocation scheme, if adopted as is, will play a very small 
role in relieving pressure from beneficiary Member States, because most 
cases will not qualify for transfer due to the new admissibility and security tests 
pre-phased to Dublin rules.  
• That Member States may choose not to participate in the scheme through 
payment of a financial contribution is also ethically and empirically at odds with 
Article 80 TFEU. 
• A centralised system, doing away with Dublin deficiencies, would be a better 
investment. It would reduce bureaucratisation, break the unfairness inherent in the 
‘first-country-of-entry’ rule, maximise fair distribution potential, and allocate 
resources more effectively. 
• Whatever the course finally taken, the rights and preferences of asylum 
seekers must be taken into account in line with EU fundamental rights 
obligations and for purely practical reasons, to diminish onward movements and 
recourse to coercion. Short of a system of free choice, the ‘matching exercise’ 
developed by EASO within the relocation scheme should be maintained.  
 
 
5.1. The coexistence of relocation with Dublin transfers 
 
The unwillingness of certain Member States to whole-heartedly engage in relocation (as 
outlined in Chapter 2) has led the European Commission to explore alternative avenues. The 
strategy for the time being is to persuade countries ‘in a political sense’ to relocate and invite 
Member States to exert ‘more peer pressure’ on each other to that effect. But Vice-President 
Timmermans has also warned that ‘other options’ will be considered in preparation for the 
10th report on relocation to be issued in March 2017.294 Infringement proceedings may 
thus be started against poor performers, specially considering what is really at stake – 
solidarity, the rule of law, and the integrity of the EU legal order in the asylum field.295 
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In parallel, the Commission proposed the consolidation of the relocation scheme through 
a proposal for a permanent mechanism in September 2015,296 which has been ‘absorbed’ 
within the subsequent Dublin IV amendment put forward in May 2016. 297  The key 
difference in design strives in the sequential, rather than cumulative application of the 
scheme alongside Dublin rules, as expounded below.  
 
Indeed, the relocation Decisions do only partly derogate from Dublin arrangements. They 
were originally conceived of as an emergency response to an unsustainable situation, but 
they were not committed to permanently overhaul the Dublin regime. In fact, relocation 
and Dublin transfers were supposed to occur simultaneously if the circumstances 
allowed. Greece, for example, received 137 Dublin requests in 2015 and received, at least, 
15 transfers, primarily from Switzerland,298 despite the ‘systemic deficiencies’ plaguing the 
Greek system.299 Italy was the second largest recipient of Dublin requests in 2015 (only after 
Hungary), with nearly 25,000 requests, coming mainly from Switzerland, Germany, and 
France. Yet, only 1.9% led to real transfers. Contrary to pronouncements of the Strasbourg 
Court in Tarakhel,300 several Member States (Austria, Sweden, and the UK) disregarded the 
requirement to obtain individual, binding assurances of treatment in line with ECHR 
standards, finding general conditions in Italy sufficient as such. By contrast, others (Belgium, 
The Netherlands) suspended all transfers due to Article 3 ECHR concerns. 301  But the 
perverse end result was eventually that, while Italy managed to relocate a limited number 
of applicants to other Member States, incoming Dublin transfers by far outnumbered 
relocation figures.302 
 
Yet, the absurdity of giving with one hand what is taken away with the other does not 
appear to strike at the heart of the European Commission plans. On the contrary, a 
Recommendation of December 2016 proposes the resumption of Dublin transfers to 
Greece starting on 15th March 2017.303 While the Commission acknowledges the serious 
difficulties still facing the Greek system – corroborated by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe overseeing the implementation of the MSS judgement304 – noting, for 
instance, that there are ‘remaining systemic deficiencies’ to be addressed, including with 
regard to reception and processing capacity and staffing problems, ‘serious concerns’ with 
UAMs and vulnerable applicants at large,  and with the ‘quality of the reception facilities 
[which] still fall short of the requirements [of the Reception Conditions Directive]’, 305 
nonetheless, it considers that ‘significant progress has been attained’ in establishing the 
‘essential’ legal and institutional structures. Thus, the recommendation to resume Dublin 
transfers ‘gradually’ and ‘on the basis of individual assurances, taking account of the 
capacities for reception and treatment of applications in conformity with relevant EU 
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legislation’ is deemed justified.306 The fact that the prospects of a fully functional asylum 
regime in the short run are utterly unrealistic, because of the ‘large number of new asylum 
applicants…arising from the implementation of the pre-registration exercise, the continuing 
arrivals…and from responsibilities under the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement’, as 
the Commission itself avows, is not taken properly into account.307  
 
Although political will alone cannot restore mutual trust without a material basis in real and 
effective compliance with the relevant standards in practice, this seems to be precisely the 
path taken by the European Commission. ‘Aspirational mutual trust’ is thus gaining terrain 
as the principle structuring responsibility allocation and intra-EU solidarity.  
 
5.2. Consolidating relocation: the Dublin IV proposal 
 
The Dublin IV proposal, in connection with the above, contemplates the primacy of Dublin 
transfers over relocation, which is configured as a minimalistic, emergency-driven, ex 
post, palliative measure to be actioned only as a last resort. Whether this configuration 
of solidarity amounts to ‘fair’ sharing of responsibility as per the terms of Article 80 TFEU 
should thus be questioned.  
 
Indeed, the Dublin IV provisions, as put forward by the Commission, maintain the gist of 
Dublin III as far as responsibility allocation is concerned. For the Commission, ‘[t]he 
objectives of the Dublin Regulation…remain valid’ so that ‘the current criteria in the Dublin 
system should be preserved’.308 Dublin remains considered ‘the cornerstone of the Common 
European Asylum System’, 309  despite its track record of ineffectiveness and under-
performance, which the Commission explicitly acknowledges. Indeed, while the significant 
costs of running the Dublin system have been estimated to approximate EUR 1 billion, the 
‘limited impact’ of Dublin III in the distribution of applicants, with ‘net transfers…close to 
zero’ and ‘incoming and outgoing requests cancel[ling] out each other’, has been no bar to 
propose keeping the current regime.310  
 
The ‘disproportionate responsibility placed on Member States at the external border’ 
is also largely ignored.311 What is more, retaining ‘the link between responsibility in the 
field of asylum and…obligations in terms of protection of the external border’ is considered 
key. 312  So, instead of relieving burdens from peripheral Member States through the 
elimination of the ‘first-country-of-entry’ rule, the proposal not only consolidates current 
criteria, but also eliminates margins of manoeuvre, for instance, by narrowing down 
the scope for recourse to the sovereignty and humanitarian clauses, 313  by 
eliminating deadlines to retention of responsibility for irregular entry (the 12-month 
limit disappears, so that first-entry Member States retain responsibility under the new 
rules314), and by generating additional responsibilities, through the interfacing of a pre-
Dublin admissibility stage prior to the allocation test.315 
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In this context, where responsibility burdens are likely to be even less evenly 
distributed than under Dublin III, Dublin IV proposes an automated system of corrective 
allocation, which however entrenches and deepens disparities between Member States. In 
fact, the mechanism will only be triggered not after 100% of capacities have been exceeded, 
but when an extra 50% has piled up. Again, whether this is ‘fair’ in the sense of Article 
80 TFEU is doubtful - even more so if the so-called ‘financial solidarity clause’ is examined 
and the nuances of the corrective allocation regime analysed in detail. 
 
5.3. Advantages of the corrective allocation mechanism 
 
According to EASO, the mere existence of a relocation scheme is to be celebrated as a 
big political success. The fact that Italy and Greece can be relieved, though limitedly, of 
asylum responsibilities, offering protection seekers a safe and legal way out of penury is an 
achievement.316 By the same token, maintaining a relocation component as part of the CEAS 
reform should per se be welcomed – specially if it is considered that otherwise the Relocation 
Decisions will phase out after the September 2017 deadline, leaving the CEAS with no 
corrective re-distribution of protection burdens whatsoever.317 So, the incorporation of the 
relocation mechanism into Dublin IV will ensure the continuity of the scheme. 
 
The fact that Dublin IV envisages its incorporation as a stable part of the system (as 
opposed to the contingency nature of the Relocation Decisions) will contribute to enhance 
certainty and infuse some measure of responsibility sharing on a permanent basis. 
Yet, as detailed below, the main components of the proposed mechanism should be rethought 
to overcome the shortcomings inherent in the Dublin rules, drawing on the experience gained 
from the implementation of the Relocation Decisions. 
 
5.4. Disadvantages of the corrective allocation mechanism  
 
It is only ‘after the admissibility check’ to be performed by beneficiary Member States that 
new applications will be allocated to another Member State. The new responsible State is one 
whose asylum caseload is below its capacity, as per the predefined reference key established 
in the draft Regulation.318 It is envisaged that inadmissible cases will not be transferred 
at all. Instead, they will await removal from the Member State of first entry. The one key 
exception, as discussed in Chapter 1, are family unity assessments, which must be conducted 
in advance (and regardless) of inadmissibility determinations, as it would not be compatible 
with the human rights to family life or ‘best interests’ of the child to reject as inadmissible 
the claim of an individual with close family members in the Dublin zone.319 
 
According to proposed Article 3, before applying the criteria for determination of 
responsibility for examination of asylum requests, the Member State of first entry will have 
to determine the admissibility of the application according to the ‘Safe Third Country’ and 
‘First Country of Asylum’ criteria of the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD). They will also 
have to check the foundedness of the application pursuant to the ‘Safe Country of Origin’ list 
adopted at EU level in an accelerated procedure. And they will also have to run a security 
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test to ascertain whether the applicant may be considered a danger to the national security 
or public order of the Member States. In any of these cases, if the application is adjudged to 
be inadmissible or unfounded, the Member State of first application will retain 
responsibility for Dublin purposes and no transfer will take place. The rationale is possibly 
to enhance procedural economy and avoid the transfer of applicants whose claims are likely 
to be rejected,320 but at the cost of increasing responsibility of first-entry countries.  
 
No exception is made in the context of the corrective mechanism. Pursuant to draft 
Article 36(3), ‘[a]pplications declared inadmissible or examined in accelerated procedures in 
accordance with Article 3(3) shall not be subject to allocation’ (emphasis added). Therefore, 
the actual relief that the corrective allocation mechanism may entail risks being negligible. 
Depending on how admissibility criteria are applied, many applications may be deemed 
inadmissible, meaning that few candidates will be eligible for relocation – even in the case of 
a 50% excess of capacity. The experience in Greece after the EU-Turkey Statement certainly 
suggests that this is likely. However, it should be borne in mind that deeming applications to 
be inadmissible in a blanket or generalised way (as seems to be the aim under the EU-Turkey 
Statement) is legally dubious, and leads to appeals and judicial reviews, creating further 
blockages in the system.   
 
The financial solidarity clause in draft Article 37 allows Member States to ‘pay not to 
play’ for a 12-month period under payment of EUR 250,000 per applicant they should have 
taken charge of.321 However, the proposal fails to indicate whether renewal of suspension is 
admissible, how many times it can be invoked, or by how many Member States 
simultaneously, and it does not appear to preclude arbitrary decisions not to participate, 
which will not be controlled in any way. The Member State concerned needs solely ‘notify’ its 
intention not to contribute to the corrective allocation scheme, with EASO simply ‘monitoring’ 
the situation and ‘reporting’ to the Commission, but with no penalties or negative incentives 
for non-compliance beyond the solidarity sums contemplated in the draft Regulation322 - 
which some Member States have already complained of and are likely to be reduced during 
Council negotiations.323 In any event, since financial allocations alone, as seen in the 
Greek experience, cannot effectively address structural unfitness, the conformity of this 
option with the spirit of Article 80 TFEU is not warranted at all. Indeed, the Greek relocation 
experience shows that, in times of crisis, it is difficult for a country to absorb EU funds quickly 
to enhance reception and processing capacities in the short to medium run. So, beside the 
ethical unsuitability of this clause, allowing Member States to pay their way out of intra-EU 
solidarity (thereby undermining the emergence of a ‘Europeanised’ approach to asylum 
management in line with Article 80 TFEU and Article 4(3) TEU), the practical incapacity of 
financial aid alone to operate improvements on the ground at the required pace should lead 
to its rejection and replacement with a clear focus on compulsory solidarity formulas – 
following the example, for instance, of the EBCG Regulation. 
 
The management of the corrective allocation mechanism, especially during the time of 
crisis for which it is envisaged to operate, is too heavily bureaucratised.324 While it is true 
that activation will be automatic, as soon as the 150% ceiling has been reached, through a 
                                                 
320 Maiani, The Reform of the Dublin III Regulation, Study PE 571.360, (European Parliament, 2016), p. 31. 
321 Ibid., p. 34. 
322 Dublin IV Proposal, p. 19. 
323 See Council doc. 12724/16, 4 October 2016, para. 8; Council doc. 14708/16, 28 November 2016, para. 4; and 
Amendment 10, Committee of the Regions Opinion, Council doc. 15635/16, 19 December 2016: ‘…the amount of 
the contribution should be set at a level that is fair and sustainable, so as not to exacerbate public opinion, and lead 
to certain Member States rejecting the very principle of solidarity out of hand’, the Committee of the Regions thus 
proposes a reduction to EUR 60,000. 
324 For a similar perception of the management of the relocation scheme, see Violeta Moreno-Lax, Telephone 
Interview with EU Official C (London, 16 February 2017). 
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system that will monitor capacities on a weekly basis,325 transfer of qualifying cases will 
not be immediate. Relevant information is supposed to be exchanged first. The benefiting 
Member State shall transmit fingerprint data for security verification by the allocated 
Member State. If the check reveals ‘serious reasons’ for an applicant to be considered a 
threat, he/she will remain in the benefitting Member State, to whom responsibility in Dublin 
terms will revert.326 The practical experience with relocation to date suggests that national 
security objections can seriously hamper relocation, and lead to asylum seekers whose 
ostensible threat to national security is not clarified. Without further elaboration of both the 
substantive and procedural rules for security screenings, the proposal risks becoming 
unworkable. Leaving the ‘serious reasons’ on which transfers may be rejected undefined 
will reproduce the uncertainties deriving from the security screenings provided for in the 
Relocation Decisions, with the potential to undermining the functioning of the scheme on 
indeterminate grounds.327 
 
The fact that costs of allocation transfers will not be centralised also risks causing 
problems. In a situation in which benefiting Member States will be experiencing a 50% excess 
on their assumed capacities, a system of advance payment as contemplated in draft Article 
42 is likely to strain resources further and compound delays.  
 
It remains unclear how reference numbers will be calculated. That they will be 
determined in accordance to a fixed reference key, as per proposed Article 35, taking account 
of objective factors, such as total population and total GDP, may contribute to fairness – 
although other corrective elements, as those used within the Relocation Decisions, including 
territory and joblessness rates would have also helped. Yet, it is not immediately apparent 
what the ‘application’ of that key ‘to the total number of applications as well as the total 
number of resettled persons that have been entered in the respective Member State 
responsible in the automated system during the preceding 12 months’ will entail. Whether 
fluctuation in stock and flow data will also be taken into account is also not stated, which 
could lead to different (more or less fair) outcomes. In a previous study by the research 
team, it was concluded that different distribution key models (taking more or less factors into 
account) did not have a significant impact on final allocation quotas.328 The essential point is 
that the ‘application’ of the key to Member State capacities is administered at EU level to 
guarantee fairness and neutrality and minimise Member State disagreement and 
politicisation. 
 
At the more operational level, the fact that the automated system does not yet exist, 
that it will be operated by EU-LISA (the EU agency in charge of large IT systems in the field 
of home affairs),329 but that responsibility for entering and adapting the reference key will 
fall on EASO, on the basis, however, of data provided by the asylum authorities of the Member 
States and EUROSTAT, may prove challenging. 330  There is no clear hierarchy or 
coordination strategy indicated in the draft Regulation between the actors concerned. A 
more centralised organisation in the hands of the Commission or EASO itself (or the future 
EU Asylum Agency) may improve the workings of the system. 
 
Finally, and most importantly, the Dublin IV model does not appear to factor in the 
preferences of asylum seekers for the Member State of allocation in any way. Breaking 
                                                 
325 Dublin IV Proposal, draft Arts 34 and 36. 
326 Ibid., draft Art 40. 
327 Violeta Moreno-Lax, Telephone Interview with EU Official B (Brussels, 9 February 2017); and Violeta Moreno-
Lax, Telephone Interview with EU Official C (London, 16 February 2017). 
328 Guild et al., Enhancing the Common European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin, Study PE 519.234 
(European Parliament, 2015). 
329 Dublin IV Proposal, draft Art 44. 
330 Ibid., draft Arts 45 and 35. 
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away from the ‘matching’ test undertaken as part of the relocation scheme – and on 
which EASO is investing hugely for its refinement and further enhancement (including 
through the development of an online platform)331 – the corrective mechanism does not 
contemplate any input at all on the part of the asylum seeker. There is equally no indication 
of specific appeal rights against (random) allocation decisions – draft Article 38 merely 
provides that the benefiting Member State must ‘notify without delay’ the decision to transfer 
and ‘transfer the applicant’ within 4 weeks from the final transfer decision. Drawing from 
experience with the relocation scheme, denying asylum seekers agency and voice 
undermines trust and cooperation with the system, exacerbating disengagement, 
and increases rates of onward movement.332  
 
Regrettably, the Dublin IV proposal consolidates, in a manner likely to lead to human 
rights violations, a punitive coercive approach, in particular to onward movement. 
Asylum-seekers must apply in the responsible Member State under pain of reduction or 
elimination of reception conditions and procedural rights. 333  In contrast, EASO itself 
acknowledges the advantages of taking account of relocation candidate preferences as a 
method that maximises integration chances and enhances trust in the system, as 
demonstrated by the use and development of the ‘matching’ system. That asylum seekers 
cannot choose the country of destination is one ‘main problem’ in the current relocation 
scheme.334 
  
5.5. Conclusions and Recommendations: Alternatives to the 
envisaged scheme  
 
Unless the system of relocation is made operationally binding, it will not work.335 As 
long as Member States are permitted multiple ways to avoid or evade their obligations, it will 
be frail. Depending on national pledges of available places, maintaining amorphous security 
grounds, and possibly allowing an opt-out from through financial contributions are likely to 
render relocation ineffective in practice. 
 
A centralised organisation of the overall Dublin regime, including through the collection of 
applications at Union level and a central distribution of responsibility by EASO (or its 
successor Asylum Agency) would contribute to the rationalisation of the system, reducing 
bureaucratisation, duplication of efforts, and waste of procedural and material resources. 
Pre-Dublin admissibility and security checks could them be eliminated, with direct 
allocations of responsibility according to predetermined distribution rates. This 
would concretise relocation as an ex ante element of responsibility allocation, rather than as 
an ex post, emergency-driven, corrective tool as currently designed, diminishing the odds of 
a crisis developing and addressing the structural unfairness inbuilt in the ‘first-country-of-
entry-rule’ system - whereby responsibility attaches to geographical proximity to the external 
borders of the EU - in far better alignment with Article 80 TFEU. Such a system would 
overall better reflect the European character of the Common European Asylum System to 
which Dublin belongs.  
 
Our choice for a centralised structure is not ideologically motivated, but empirically grounded. 
The general experience with responsibility-sharing for refugees (globally and in Europe) 
suggests that centralisation is not inherently superior to ad hoc mechanisms for 
responsibility-sharing. Instead, both approaches may have a role to play; in some instances 
                                                 
331 Violeta Moreno-Lax, Telephone Interview with EU Official C (London, 16 February 2017). 
332 Violeta Moreno-Lax, Telephone Interview with EU Official B (Brussels, 9 February 2017). 
333 Dublin IV Proposal, draft Arts 4 and 5. 
334 Concurrently: Violeta Moreno-Lax, Telephone Interview with EU Official B (Brussels, 9 February 2017). 
335 Ibid. 
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(where a crisis response is needed to address a particularly urgent refugee situation) a 
‘hybrid’ model with both centralized and ad hoc elements is likely to be the most effective.336   
However, in the supra-national, constitutionalised, institutionally-dense context of the EU, 
enhanced coordination and common detailed rules are necessary to foster a 
harmonised approach and a common understanding of the problem and the solutions 
required to face them. The non-political administration of the scheme in the hands of a 
common institution is also likely to be more effective, provided that local support for the 
arrivals of asylum seekers can be harnessed to sustain the system.  
 
Otherwise, if the current configuration (or close variations) of the Commission proposal is 
maintained, one key element to be amended, if the system is to work, concerns the input 
of asylum seekers in relocation decisions. Their rights and preferences must be properly 
heeded in line with EU Charter guarantees. Therefore, short of a ‘free choice’ mechanism, 
the EASO ‘preference matching’ tool should be preserved and expanded. Ignoring rights and 
interests of asylum seekers and refugees contributes to the coercive approach, which not 
only leads to human rights violations (in particular in the form of arbitrary detention), but is 
also counter-productive, as the experience in Italy and Greece demonstrates.  
  
                                                 
336 See, generally, Betts, Costello & Zaun ‘A Fair Share’: Refugees and Responsibility-Sharing (Paper Prepared for 
DELMI, 2017, forthcoming). 
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CHAPTER 6: DEFINING THE BASE FOR EFFECTIVE 
RELOCATION: A RIGHTS-BASED, DIGNITY-ORIENTED 
APPROACH FOLLOWING THE ‘DUBLIN WITHOUT 
COERCION’ PARADIGM  
 
KEY FINDINGS 
• In the relocation of asylum seekers, reunification of family members must 
always take priority over relocation elsewhere; 
• The preference of the asylum seeker should be the first priority of any 
relocation system, as this favours integration and reduces onward movement. 
Only if this preference cannot be reasonably accommodated should other options 
be considered. 
• The voluntary sector must be fully involved in assisting asylum seekers in 
considering their options regarding relocation and making informed choices. 
• A clearing-house approach to relocation could be useful where offers and 
choices can be matched to achieve the best outcomes for both asylum seekers 
and Member States. 
• Whatever the system finally retained, the key tenets of the ‘Dublin without 
coercion’ model must be respected, taking full account of asylum seekers 
agency and dignity. 
 
  
 
The Dublin IV proposals described in the preceding Chapter seek to create a corrective 
mechanism to distribute asylum seekers around the EU in a manner consistent with the 
distribution key which takes into account population size and GDP.  
 
Yet, this study urges that relocation under the distribution key should only be pursued 
when reunion on the basis of family links has been fully exhausted. Within the Dublin 
system, the take-charge provisions should have priority over relocation, as the 
ultimate objective of the process to guarantee international protection is delivered 
successfully and the outcomes in the Member States are optimal. Family members have the 
greatest interest in ensuring that newly arriving family members integrate successfully in the 
host Member State. The set backs of family members are a matter of concern and 
disappointment of the whole extended family. Further, the importance of family members in 
work to finding employment for new arrivals must never be underestimated. Of course, in 
Member States with historically low unemployment levels this is less of a concern than in 
those Member States with higher joblessness levels. Friends and family willing to assist 
people to find jobs or make a success of self-employment is often key to economic 
integration. Thus, even for practical reasons, this study recommends to the EU institutions 
to invest substantial resources and efforts in ensuring the widest use of family reunification 
in the relocation of asylum seekers. This entails a wide definition of family members among 
those sponsoring and those being relocated. It also means providing real assistance to 
asylum seekers subject to relocation, to find where their family members are. The Red Cross 
has extensive experience in family tracing and could be engaged in the process to this effect. 
 
Only once family links as a basis for relocation have been fully explored and exhausted, 
should a wider relocation system be brought into play. As explained in Chapters 2 and 3, 
many asylum seekers who have arrived in Greece and Italy and got stuck there would be 
willing to move anywhere where they would have at their disposal decent living conditions 
and the chance of making a new life. Thus, two things are key to making the Dublin IV 
relocation provisions workable. Above all, asylum seekers need reliable and accurate 
information about the living conditions and integration possibilities for them in the 
proposed relocation State. The engagement of civil society is key in making relocation 
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work properly in this regard. The research team considers that non-governmental 
organisations, educational bodies, and religious institutions all have a role to play in making 
a success of relocation. When they are actively involved in relocation, they can play a central 
role in providing information to asylum seekers, which is not tainted by the possible suspicion 
of State or EU institutional interests. Further, people who do not have State functions in the 
asylum determination system, but are charged with an exclusive task of assisting the 
integration of asylum seekers, are well placed to act as a bridge between State and EU 
officials and asylum seekers. These bodies should be fully integrated into the relocation 
process.  
 
As the active participation of asylum seekers is an essential part of making 
relocation effective and durable, it is important to make available to asylum seekers as 
much information as possible, provide counselling on the relocation process, and assist them 
to make informed decisions about their lives, rather than handing down decisions on 
relocation where they have had no involvement in the process. Engagement and participation 
in the relocation decision-making process is critical, as it enhances integration potential, 
fosters cooperation and mutual trust, and reduces the chances of onward 
movement. The Dublin IV proposal should include concrete measures to prioritise the 
choices of asylum seekers regarding relocation and provide for practical steps to ensure 
that asylum seekers can take fully informed decisions with the involvement of civil society. 
Where it is not possible to accommodate asylum seekers choices of relocation, this needs to 
be fully explained to them together with the reasons why it is not possible to accommodate 
those reasonable preferences. If the reason is a temporary one, which is likely to be resolved 
quickly, the asylum seeker should have the option of awaiting the imminent opening of 
relocation places in the Member State of his or her first choice. A time limit may be placed 
on that waiting period, so that people do not end up waiting years for relocation. 
 
The establishment of a clearing-house system, as many Member States have for young 
people seeking university places, may be an idea worth pursuing. Successful examples of 
Member State allocation of supply and demand in socio-educational situations deserve 
attention, as effective mechanisms to accommodate the reasonable demands of prospective 
students seeking higher education on the basis of dignity and respect. These same 
principles can and should be applied to asylum seekers within the relocation system. 
 
In any event, coercion should always be avoided in relocation schemes. The more asylum 
seekers are coerced into accepting choices which they have not made themselves and in 
respect of which they have not been consulted, the less likely the relocation system will 
deliver in the longer term. The willingness of people to make a go of a new situation always 
depends on the extent to which they consider that they have participated in choosing the 
situation. This is as true of asylum seekers as anyone else. The use of coercion risks leading 
to failure and resentment and requires a much greater degree of effort, resources, and public 
spending on the part of the receiving community to reconcile the reluctantly relocated asylum 
seeker to the benefits of his or her new home. The key tenets of the ‘Dublin without 
coercion’ model,337 taking full account of asylum seekers agency and dignity, should be 
incorporated into any replacements of the Dublin III Regulation and Relocation 
Decisions. 
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APPENDIX I:  METHODOLOGY 
To understand better the role of receiving states in relocation, the research team 
conducted a survey and – where possible –follow-up semi-structured interviews with national 
contact points and pertinent NGOs, referred to us by ECRE as working on relocation in the 
Member States. If actors preferred this, the researchers also gave them the opportunity to 
respond to the interview immediately without responding to the survey previously to ensure 
a better response rate. The survey questionnaire was sent to the national contact points 
through EASO. Given time constraints, the response rate from national contact points was 
relatively low with 33,3% (9 in 27 national contact points responded).  However, the low 
response rate may also be symptomatic of the lack of political commitment to relocation.  In 
contrast, ten out of eleven NGOs the research team contacted initially responded. Yet, only 
seven felt they were expert enough on the issue to talk to us in an interview or answer the 
survey questions. The remaining contact points referred us to NGOs to us that they felt had 
greater expertise in the area. Given time constraints the research team were only able to 
conduct five interviews. All interviews were anonymised. The findings were also 
complemented by secondary sources – NGO and press reports as well as scholarship.  
 
In Greece, twenty key stakeholders were identified to participate in the survey but due to 
time constraints, limited human resources and busy schedule of officials, there was a limited 
access to resources. The spoken languages were Greek and English.  A survey was sent to 
all actors, with a response rate of 20% (5 actors).  In addition, semi-structured telephone 
interviews were held with 1 representative of UNHCR Greece, 1 official of the Greek Ministry 
of Interior, 1 independent humanitarian advisor, 2 representatives from NGO sector. The 
research team also received feedback from 1 coordinator of a refugee center and 3 asylum 
seekers awaiting to be relocated, and provided summaries of these discussions, duly 
anonymised.  
 
In Italy, fifteen actors were identified among Italian and EU institutions, international 
organisations, NGO networks directly or indirectly involved in the relocation procedure 
there.338  Key stakeholders were invited to participate in semi-structured interviews (of 
approximately an hour). Four interviews were conducted individually or in small groups by 
phone or on Skype. 339 One interview was conducted in person and seven respondents 
provided written inputs. Three actors declined the invitation. 340  Written consent to be 
interviewed was requested and obtained from all named respondents. In addition to 
interviews, relevant information on relocation obtained in an informal meeting of NGO 
networks, held in Rome during the first half of February 2017.  
 
Feedback on the problems on the ground collected from a group of eligible asylum seekers 
who left their reception centres between January and February 2017 and moved to Rome in 
the attempt to fast-track their relocation. Ten asylum seekers, all young male Eritrean 
nationals hosted in Rome by the Red Cross, agreed to release an unstructured group 
interview on 18 February 2017, in the presence of two interpreters speaking Tigrinya, Arabic 
and Italian. The interview lasted four hours and all information was collected in Italian, 
anonymised and translated into English. Experiences and difficulties reported by these 
applicants complete this overview on the first year of implementation of the relocation 
procedure in Italy. 
 
The official EU reports and documents were also complemented by a set of semi-structured 
interviews with key EU officials in pertinent institutional roles.  
                                                 
338 Namely one institutional actor, one EU agency, two international organisations and eleven NGOs.  
339 Two of them were anonymised upon request. 
340 In total, nine complete interviews were collected, while written input by three of whom responded answering only 
a marginal number of survey questions were taken into consideration within the analysis of findings. 
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APPENDIX II: LIST OF INTERVIEWS/SURVEY/OTHER 
ORIGINAL DATA 
 
• Christina Velentza, Telephone Interview with Official A (Athens, 15 February 2017). 
• Christina Velentza, Written Interview with Fotini Rantsiou, Independent humanitarian 
advisor (Athens, 17 February 2017).  
• Christina Velentza, Telephone Interview with Refugee Center Coordinator (Athens, 10 
February 2017).  
• Christina Velentza, Written Interview with NGO Official B (Athens, 21 February 2017). 
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Refugee Council – CIR (Rome, 15 February 2017); 
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(Rome, 21 February 2017); 
• Daniela Vitiello, Written Interview with Valentina Brinis, A buon diritto – ABD (Rome, 9 
February 2017); 
• E-Mail, NGO B, 16 February 2017. 
• Natascha Zaun, Skype Interview with NGO A, (Oxford, 13 February 2017). 
• Natascha Zaun, Telephone Interview Official A, (Oxford, 14 February 2017). 
• Natascha Zaun, Telephone Interview with NGO C, (Oxford, 20 February 2017). 
• Natascha Zaun, Telephone Interview with NGO C, (Oxford, 20 February 2017). 
• Survey NGO E, 20 February 2017. 
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• Survey, NGO D, 20 February 2017.   
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• Survey Official E, 2 March 2017. 
• Survey Official F, 3 March 2017. 
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• Survey Official H, 28 February 2017. 
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ANNEX I: RELOCATING MEMBER STATES 
 
 
Table 5: Asylum seekers relocated in relation to responsibility 
Member 
State 
 
Asylum-
seekers 
relocated 
Remaining places 
from the 160,000 
Total 
responsibilit
y 
Percentage of 
responsibility 
fulfilled 
Austria 0 1953 1953 0.0% 
Belgium 206 3606 3812 5.4% 
Bulgaria 29 1273 1302 2.2% 
Croatia 19 949 968 2.0% 
Cyprus 65 255 320 20.3% 
Czech 
Republic 12 2679 2691 0.4% 
Estonia 78 251 329 23.7% 
Finland 919 1159 2078 44.2% 
France 2696 17018 19714 13.7% 
Germany 1349 26187 27536 4.9% 
Hungary 0 1294 1294 0.0% 
Ireland 241 359 600 40.2% 
Latvia 197 284 481 41.0% 
Lithuania 229 442 671 34.1% 
Luxemburg 226 331 557 40.6% 
Malta 80 51 131 61.1% 
Netherlands 1274 4673 5947 21.4% 
Poland 0 6128 6128 0.0% 
Portugal 922 2029 2951 31.2% 
Romania 558 3622 4180 13.3% 
Slovakia 9 893 902 1.0% 
Slovenia 124 443 567 21.9% 
Spain 745 8578 9323 8.0% 
Sweden 39 3727 3766 1.0% 
Norway 493 502 995 49.5% 
Switzerland 368 712 1080 34.1% 
Liechtenstein 10 0 10 100% 
Source: European Commission, ‘Member States’ Support to Emergency Relocation 
Mechanism’ (as of 25 January 2017), available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-
material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf . 
1 Ireland has opted into the relocation scheme. 
2 Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland have established bilateral agreements according to 
Article 11 of the Council Decisions and joined the relocation scheme. As part of these 
commitments Norway has formally pledged 995 places, Switzerland 1080 and Liechtenstein 
10. In the case of these countries the pledges represent the maximum numbers these states 
are responsible for.   
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Table 6: Pledges made in relation to responsibility 
Member State Pledges Responsibility 
Pledges in relation to 
responsibility 
Austria 0 1953 0.0% 
Belgium 530 3812 13.9% 
Bulgaria 400 1302 30.7% 
Croatia 46 968 4.8% 
Cyprus 140 320 43.8% 
Czech Republic 50 2691 1.9% 
Estonia 210 329 63.8% 
Finland 1420 2078 68.3% 
France 4170 19714 21.2% 
Germany 5250 27536 19.1% 
Hungary 0 1294 0.0% 
Ireland1 514 600 85.7% 
Latvia 394 481 81.9% 
Lithuania 550 671 82.0% 
Luxemburg 270 557 48.5% 
Malta 99 131 75.6% 
Netherlands 1525 5947 25.6% 
Poland 100 6128 1.6% 
Portugal 1618 2951 54.8% 
Romania 1702 4180 40.7% 
Slovakia 30 902 3.3% 
Slovenia 180 567 31.7% 
Spain 900 9323 9.7% 
Sweden 50 3766 1.3% 
Norway2 995 995 100.0% 
Switzerland2 1080 1080 100.0% 
Liechtenstein2 10 10 100.0% 
Source: All numbers used are based on the European Commission’s Member States’ 
Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism (as of 25 January 2017).   
1 Ireland has opted into the relocation scheme. 
2 The associated Member States Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein agreed to 
relocate asylum-seekers through bilateral arrangements according to Article 11 of the 
Council Decision and joined the relocation scheme. However, they were not allocated 
places as part of a distribution key. Instead they could pledge places. Therefore, 
pledges and responsibilities are equal for these countries. 
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Table 7: Relocations from Italy 
Member 
State 
Responsibility 
Italy 
Relocated from 
Italy 
Percentage relocated 
Italy 
Austria 1201 0 0.0% 
Belgium 1411 29 2.1% 
Bulgaria 551 0 0.0% 
Croatia 586 9 1.5% 
Cyprus 140 10 7.1% 
Czech 
Republic 1184 0 0.0% 
Estonia 491 0 0.0% 
Finland 787 359 45.6% 
France 7175 282 3.9% 
Germany 9346 455 4.9% 
Hungary 496 0 0.0% 
Ireland1 N/A 0 N/A 
Latvia 378 9 2.4% 
Lithuania 403 0 0.0% 
Luxemburg 278 61 21.9% 
Malta 192 46 24.0% 
Netherlands 2166 380 17.5% 
Poland 2802 0 0.0% 
Portugal 1421 271 19.1% 
Romania 1627 45 2.8% 
Slovakia 666 0 0.0% 
Slovenia  379 23 6.1% 
Spain 4514 144 3.2% 
Sweden 1402 39 2.8% 
Norway N/A 415 N/A 
Switzerland N/A 340 N/A 
Liechtenstein N/A 0 N/A 
Sources: European Commission, ‘Press Release: European Commission makes 
progress on Agenda on Migration’, 27 May 2015, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5039_en.htm. Council Decision 
2016/1754 of 29 September 2016 amending Decision (EU) 2015/1601 establishing 
provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy 
and Greece, p. 39-40, available at: 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12098-2015-INIT/en/pdf. 
1 Numbers on the individual responsibilities of Ireland are missing. 
2 Numbers on the commitments made by Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein 
vis-à-vis Italy and Greece are missing. 
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Table 8: Relocation from Greece 
Member 
State 
Responsibilty 
Greece 
Relocated from 
Greece 
Percentage relocated 
Greece 
Austria 2014 0 0.0% 
Belgium 2463 177 7.2% 
Bulgaria 901 29 3.2% 
Croatia 746 10 1.3% 
Cyprus 184 55 29.9% 
Czech 
Republic 1782 12 0.7% 
Estonia 452 78 17.3% 
Finland 1324 560 42.3% 
France 12794 2414 18.9% 
Germany 16711 894 5.3% 
Hungary 331 0 0.0% 
Ireland1 N/A 241 N/A 
Latvia 428 188 43.9% 
Lithuania 529 228 43.1% 
Luxemburg 332 165 49.7% 
Malta 173 34 19.7% 
Netherlands 3849 894 23.2% 
Poland 4965 0 0.0% 
Portugal 1971 651 33.0% 
Romania 2633 513 19.5% 
Slovakia 945 9 1.0% 
Slovenia  463 101 21.8% 
Spain 7986 601 7.5% 
Sweden 2425 0 0.0% 
Norway2 N/A 78 N/A 
Switzerland2 N/A 28 N/A 
Liechtenstein2 N/A 10 N/A 
Sources: European Commission, ‘Press Release: European Commission makes progress 
on Agenda on Migration’, 27 May 2015, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-5039_en.htm. Council Decision 2016/1754 of 29 September 2016 
amending Decision (EU) 2015/1601 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, p. 39-40, available at: 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12098-2015-INIT/en/pdf.  
1 Numbers on the individual responsibilities of Ireland are missing. 
2 Numbers on the commitments made by Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein vis-à-
vis Italy and Greece are missing. 
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Figure 3: Top 10 relocators and their performance 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Top ten pledgers 
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